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THE RESERVE RATIO of commercial banks has varied considerably and
with important effects on the rate of growth of the money stock. The
aggregate reserve ratio is a weighted average of the ratios for individual
banks, and fluctuations in the aggregate may reflect either shifts in the
distribution of deposits—a change in weights—or changes in the reserve
ratios of individual banks. The latter in turn may reflect either changes
in reserve requirements or decisions of individual banks to alter their
reserve positions.Such decisions can be viewed as one part of the
broader decisions banks regularly make concerning the composition
of their portfolios. The advantages of certain assets offering a high
degree of liquidity and little risk of loss—such as call loans with
securities as collateral in an earlier day or Treasury bills today—are
balanced against the advantages of less liquid assets providing sub-
stantially higher return—such as mortgages or term loans.The
desired fraction of cash in the portfolio to provide a margin of safety
against future withdrawal of deposits is not the same for every sit-
uation and is constantly reappraised in the light of new alternatives
and changing circumstances.
Such appraisals are not different in principle from those of individual
investors, but there are important practical differences.Banks are
subject to legal restrictions on the composition of their portfolios and
follow certain well-established practices of commercial banking.In
particular, because most of their liabilities are subject to withdrawal
on demand or short notice, they need large cash reserves. Nevertheless,
changing conditions constantly offer choices between acceptable assets
with different qualities and rates of return.Selection depends upon
price and quality of alternatives as well as the aforementioned needs
for liquidity and safety.
The broad subject of portfolio selection is only touched upon here,
but its omission does not appear to hamper the analysis of major
fluctuations in the cash reserve ratio. Many of the factors affecting152 THE RESERVE RATIO
reserve ratios differ in their influence only as between cash and all
other assets and are unrelated to the composition of noncash assets.
Two such factors are the distribution of deposits among banks and
statutory reserve requirements, both largely unrelated to the response
of individual banks to the profitability or liquidity of the noncash
portions of portfolios. The first, discussed in section 1, involves shifts
in the distribution of deposits between banks with different ratios or
between time and demand deposits, which can alter the aggregate
ratio even though the ratio for deposits of each kind remains un-
changed. In fact, however, those shifts have usually not had important
effects,1 The second factor, requirements imposed by law on reserves,
discussed in section 2, has had an important influence on banks' cash
holdings.
In addition to the effects of changes in legal reserve requirements,
there are other sizable movements in the reserve ratio over both long
and short periods. These are discussed in sections 3 and 4. The im-
portant factors for long-run movements are various institutional
changes in the monetary system that improved stability and lessened
the need of banks for cash reserves. The short-run movements are
related to the business cycle.In part they may reflect changes in
interest rates and in the demand for bank loans, and to that extent
involve the noncash assets of banks. On the whole, however, an
analysis of these assets is not necessary for interpretation of the major
fluctuations in the cash reserve ratio.
1. Shifts in the Distribution of Deposits
Any redistribution of deposits may affect the aggregate reserve ratio.
Banks vary in their needs and preferences for high-powered reserves
per dollar of deposits, and deposits transferred from one bank to another
are not likely to have exactly the same backing as before. Yet random
shifts among banks of deposits held by the public probably affect the
aggregate ratio very little, except perhaps temporarily while banks
adjust. Large sections of the banking system operate under the same
legal restrictions, face similar circumstances, and tend as a consequence
to maintain roughly the same ratios. Moreover, the effects of many
random shifts occurring at the same time tend to cancel out. Large
1Thereader who wishes to skip the detailed analysis may turn to the summary
at the end of sect. 1.THE RESERVE RATIO 153
changes in the aggregate ratio are usually produced either by shifts
of deposits between sectors of the banking system having appreciably
different reserve practices, or by a change in the legal reserve require-.
ments governing a bank because of a change in its legal status, which
is equivalent to a shift in deposits between two banks subject to different
requirements.
Although not the only source of different reserve ratios, legal require-
ments are an important one and so provide a convenient basis for
classifying the banking system for study of the quantitative importance
of shifts in deposits among banks. Reserve requirements differ among
types of banks and also, for particular banks, among types of deposits.
(1) The required reserve ratio of national or member banks (that is,
national banks before the Federal Reserve System and member banks
thereafter) has always been considerably higher than that of other
commercial banks as a group, which are regulated by widely varying
state laws. Banks under state jurisdiction generally have less stringent
regulations on high-powered reserves than national or member banks
do.(2) Among national or member banks, there is a further difference
according to location: Banks in central reserve cities, in other reserve
cities, and in country districts are subject to successively lower require-
ments. Though some state regulations make similar distinctions, the
data on state banks do not; consequently, analysis of the redistribution
of deposits among banks classified according to their reserve location
must be confined to national or member banks.(3) The major dif-
ference by type of deposits is the lower requirements imposed on time
deposits than on demand deposits by the Federal Reserve System.
Prior national banking legislation did not make such a distinction.
Many states had modified their laws to impose separate requirements
for time and demand deposits even before 1914; most others have
since then. In view of this diversity and of the inadequacy of the data,
the analysis of the effect of shifts between time and demand deposits
is confined to national or member banks. Each of the three kinds of
shift is considered in a subsection to follow.
SHIFTS IN DEPOSITS BETWEEN NATIONAL OR MEMBER
BANKS AND OTHER COMMERCIAL BANKS
The magnitude and time pattern of such shifts for the period 1875—
1955 are shown in Chart 15, by a graph of deposits at national or154 THE RESERVE RATIO
CHART 15
Percentage of Commercial Bank Deposits Created by National or Member Banks,
Annually and Semiannually, 1875—1955
member banks as a percentage of total deposits (except U.S. and inter-
bank deposits) at commercial banks.2 The distribution of deposits
between the two classes of commercial banks changed appreciably in
only five periods: 1877—79, 1879—86, 1898—1906, 1916—22, and 1929—
34.In the firsts and the last, there was a tendency for national or
2 The level of this series is slightly too high because lacunae in the data enforced
an inexact treatment of balances of mutual savings banks held at commercial banks—
the assumption that they are all held at national or member banks. The overstatement
in the series on this account is bound to be fairly small,
'The sharp peak in the series in 1879 apparently reflects the exceptionally large
inflows of gold in that year, which were initially deposited in New York City national
banks before spreading throughout the banking system, and perhaps also the massive
refunding of government debt undertaken in the last years of that decade.
Source: Table F-9.THE RESERVE RA TIO 155
member banks to gain deposits relative to all commercial banks,
possibly as a result of severe depressions. A similar movement of more
moderate size occurred also during 1887—89, 1893—94, 1907—08, and
1921—22, periods of depressed business, all but the first, severely so.
Consistent with the relative importance of national banks declined
during 1898—1906, a period of general prosperity; that was the time
of the spectacular development of loan and trust companies, especially
in New York City. The percentage also declined throughout 1879—86,
however—a period encompassing both expansion and contraction.
There was little variation during most of the mild business cycles or
those after 1934.
The shifts in deposits during severe cycles and before the institution
of deposit insurance in 1934seemat first sight to have a simple ex-
planation. Would not the more easily established and less restricted
state and private banks multiply in a favorable climate and go under
more readily in hard times? Though not all federally supervised banks
have weathered such storms without mishaps, they have had to meet
certain minimum standards which probably made them stronger than
most state and private banks. Evidence for such a difference can be
found in figures on bank suspensions.4 The rate of suspensions was
much greater among nonmember than member banks during the
early l930's, and among state and private than among national banks
in the panic periods of 1907—08, 1893, and 1873—74.
Yet it seems doubtful that suspensions are the main explanation.
Except in 1930—33, they were not sufficiently widespread to account
for more than a small part of the redistribution of deposits. Moreover,
in two of the periods previously listed in which national banks gained
deposits, 1877—79 and 1887—89, all classes of banks were increasing
in number. The shift in deposits away from other commercial banks
in those two periods, therefore, could not have resulted from sus-
pensions.This phenomenon will receive further examination in the
next subsection, which covers the distribution of national or member
bank deposits by reserve classification.It is suggested there that the
shifts in deposits may reflect a more general shift between large city
banks and all others, which could produce the behavior just discussed
Forthe annual number of suspensions, see Historical Statistics of the United Slates,
1789—1945, Bureau of the Census, 1949, Ser. N135—138; for the total number of
banks in each class, see Banking Studies, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1941, p. 418.156 THE RESERVE RATIO
because city banks are heavily represented in the national banking
system.
The exceptional rise in the proportion of deposits at national or
member banks from 1916 to 1922 reflects a change in federal law.
When the act ofJune 20, 1917, removed certain objectionable features
of membership in the Federal Reserve System, a sizable number of
state banks joined, most of them immediately, as indicated by the
ensuing movement in the series. Although that movement represents
a shift in the legal status of banks rather than in the location of de-
positors' accounts, the effect on the aggregate reserve ratio is the
same.
The importance of the shifts can be measured by comparing with
the actual ratio a hypothetical reserve ratio, computed as a weighted
average of the ratios for the two classes of banks and having constant
weights and so assuming no shifts occurred. For the present purpose,
the distribution of deposits at the beginning of each period can serve
as the constant set of weights. Comparison of the periods having the
largest shifts shows the largest effects and so gives a measure of their
maximum importance. The results are summarized in Table 16 for
the five periods previously identified.
Column 4, which shows changes in the aggregate ratio due to shifts
in distribution, is the difference between two weighted averages of the
separate reserve ratios for the two classes of banks, the weights in each
case being the proportion of total deposits at each class of banks. For
one weighted average (column 2) the weights are the actual pro-
portions, and the average equals the actual aggregate reserve ratio.
For the other average (column 3) the weights are the proportions at
the beginning of the period and are kept constant to its end, so that
the average equals the ratio that would have prevailed had no re-
distribution of deposits occurred between the two classes of banks.
The reserve ratio for each class of banks is defined as the aggregate
ratio is for all commercial banks—high-powered reserves to deposits.
This is not entirely satisfactory here because such a ratio takes no
account of the balances other commercial banks hold at national or
member banks: while these balances are not high-powered reserves,
they nevertheless affect the amount of such reserves held by both
classes of banks. Other commercial banks, being mostly small-town
banks, have as a group a larger sum due from than to national orTHE RESERVE RATIO 157
member banks.Part of the high-powered reserves of national or
member banks can therefore be regarded as held by them for other
commercial banks.If deposits are shifted from a nonmember to a
member bank, for example, part of the otherwise required transfer
of high-powered reserves is handled by a reduction in the balances
held by the nonmember bank at member banks.In consequence,
TABLE16
EFFECT ON RESERVE RATIO OF FIVE LARGEST SHIFTS IN DEPOSITS BETWEEN
NATIONAL OR MEMBER BN'JKS SAND OThER CO!+ERCIAL TO 1955




















Aug.1877—Aug.1879 +8.1 —0.8 —1.4 +0.6
Aug.1879—June1886 —11.5 —0.9 +0.3 —1.2
June1898—June1906 —7,0 —5.4 —4.6 —0.8
Dec.1916—June1922 +24.7 —3.2 —4.9 +1.7
Dec.1929—June1934 +12.1 +7.8 +6.3 +1.5
from Chart 15.
bBasedon Table F—9.This is equivalent to the actual change in deposits at
national or member banks minus the expected change on the basis of the actual
change in deposits of all commercial banks, expressed as a percentage of deposits
at all commercial banks at the end of the period.
CFrom Table F—l0. col. 4.
change in a weighted average of the reserve ratios for national or member
banks (Table F—ID, cal. 2) and for other commercial banks (Table F—10, col. 3),
where the weights (given by Table F—9) are those for the beginning of the period.
By ignoring net deposits of other commercial banks at national or member banks,
the change in col. 4 is slightly understated (see text).
sucha shift in deposits will not require so large a reduction in high-
powered reserves and hence in deposits of nonmember banks, nor
allow so large an increase for member banks, as might be- inferred
solely from the ratio of high-powered reserves to deposits. That ratio
is lower for other commercial banks and higher for national or member
banks than the corresponding ratio of all cash reserves, including
balances at other banks, to total deposit liabilities, including balances
owed to other banks. Hence, use of the ratio of high-powered reserves
to deposits held by the public exaggerates the effects of deposit shifts,
because it overstates the difference between the reserve positions of
the two classes of banks. In computing the appropriate reserve ratio158 THE RESERVE RATIO
for each class of banks, for strict accuracy we should reduce the high-
powered reserves of national or member banks and increase those of
other commercial banks by that amount.
Unfortunately, an accurate adjustment for these interbank balances
can not be made, because the net amount due by national or member
banks to other commercial banks is not separated from the net amount
due to mutual savings banks and foreign commercial banks. Some
rough calculations using the data available suggest that this ad-
justment would enlarge the bottom three figures in column 4 by at
most one-half a percentage point in absolute value and leave the top
two figures largely unchanged.5
Even so, the estimated effect is still relatively small, which indicates
that the actual effects account for only a small part of the major
movements in the aggregate reserve ratio.In the final three periods
represented in the table, during which sizable movements in the
reserve ratio accompanied the deposit shifts, the shifts accounted for
less than one-fifth of those movements in two periods (beginning in
1898 and 1929) and worked against the prevailing movement in the
third (1916—22).In the latter, enlargement of membership in the
Federal Reserve System reduced by almost one-third the decline in
the aggregate ratio which would otherwise have occurred.In the
two earliest periods, the estimated effect of redistribution is almost the
same in absolute magnitude as in the other periods.It is, however,
large relative to the actual change, which happened to he small.
As noted, Chart 15 reveals no other shifts of comparable size, and it
seems clear that the effects of shifts other than those listed in Table 16
must have been negligible.
One way to estimate the high-powered reserves (call them T) that national
or member banks hold behind the net amounts they owe to other commercial banks
(I) is to assume the ratio is the same as for other deposits.If H denotes total high-
powered reserves and D deposits held by the nonbanking public, the assumption is
that T/I =(H—T)/D,which implies that the corrected reserve ratio for national
or member banks is (H —T)/D=Hf(D+ I). The reserves T(=IH/[D + I]) are
assumed to belong to other commercial banks, and so their high-powered reserves
are to be increased by T. An estimate of T requires a figure for 1, which we cail only
approximate. The correction suggested in the text for col. 4 is based on this
method.
Since interbarik deposits can be highlyvolatile,banks may hold larger reserves
behind them than behind regular deposits.If so, the preceding estimate of T is too
small; and, since the reserve ratio for national or member banks is greater than the
other, the corrected ratios are further apart than they should be. Hence the correction
suggested in the text is likely to be too large in absolute value.
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SHIFTS IN DEPOSITS AMONG NATIONAL OR MEMBER
BANKS IN DIFFERENT RESERVE CLASSIFICATIONS
Since a shift in deposits between national or member banks and other
commercial banks explains little of the movements in the aggregate
reserve ratio, the movements must reflect the behavior of the com-
ponent ratios (national and nonnational, member and nonmember
banks).So far as this finding goes, each component could exhibit
movements that do not appear in the aggregate ratio because the other
component offsets them. In fact, however, movements in the two have
a high degree of correspondence. The correlation coefficient for the
period 1875—1955 is 0.67, and omitting the turbulent years 1935—45,
the coefficient is 0.84.6
The question then arises:Might some of the movements in the
reserve ratios for the two classes of banks reflect shifts in deposits among
banks according to their location by city size or reserve requirements?7
The two breakdowns can be examined together for national or member
banks, since reserve requirements happen to be imposed on these
banks roughly according to the population density of their localities.
Central and other reserve cities, in which banks have higher require-
ments than elsewhere, generally encompass the nation's largest cities.
State reserve requirements also vary with the location of banks; for
reasons given, however, further examination of shifts in deposits will
be confined to those among national or member banks. Because of
the high correlation between the ratios for these and other commercial
banks, the results for one class probably apply to the other.
To gauge the importance of the shifts, we may compare the actual
reserve ratio with one corrected for shifts. The latter may be computed
as a weighted average of the ratios for the three classes of national or
member banks (central reserve city, reserve city, and country) with
weights equal to the proportion of their aggregate deposits at each
of the three classes of banks.If the weights are kept constant over a
given period, the average is a hypothetical aggregate ratio for these
classes assuming no shifts in the relative size of their deposit liabilities.
If the true weights are used throughout, the average is the actual
6Theseries correlated were cols.1 and 3, Table F-tO.
Asset size of banks is probably also important, but data for that breakdown are






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































iTHE RESER VE RA Tb 161
aggregate ratio. The two ratios are plotted in Chart 16. The constant
weights for the hypothetical ratio are the distribution of deposits in
1914, the approximate mid-point of the time scale.Differences
between the two ratios represent departures from the 1914 distribution
of deposits.Between any two dates the approximate effects of re-
distribution are shown by changes in the gap between the two series,
displayed at the bottom of the chart on an enlarged scale.
The reserve ratio in this comparison is defined as the ratio of high-
powered reserves to deposits, including in deposits the net amount
owed to nonnational (before 1914) or nonmember (after 1914) com-
mercial banks. The inclusion assumes that these interbank deposits
have the same fraction of high-powered reserves behind them as
regular deposits do (see footnote 5). To have also adjusted each of the
three ratios in the hypothetical average ratio for the amount of high-
powered reserves held by each class of banks behind their deposits at
other national-member banks would be desirable, for reasons given
for the components (national and nonnational or member and non-
member) of the commercial bank ratio. Country banks hold balances
at central reserve city and reserve city banks, and the latter hold
balances at central reserve city banks, which prevent the full ad-
justment to deposit shifts between classes of these banks from falling
on high-powered reserves.Such balances satisfied part of the legal
reserve requirements for national or member banks before June 1917.
Even since then, such balances have been held voluntarily to facilitate
interbank transfer of funds. The adjustment of the three ratios is not
feasible, however, in the absence of published figures on the net
amounts owed each of the three classes of member banks. The data
for member banks, used for the ratios in the chart after 1917, give
total interbank deposits due from and to all other banks, including
nonmember banks. The data permit estimates of the net amount due
to nonmember banks by each class of member banks. That estimate,
as noted, is included in the denominator of the reserve ratios. Amounts
due to and from other member banks by each class, however, cannot
be segregated. Though the necessary data were reported before 1917,
the adjustment was omitted for the earlier period, as well, to preserve
comparability. The size of total interbank deposits indicates that the
maximum possible effect of the adjustment would not alter the results
significantly, so this omission can be safely ignored in interpreting162 THE RESERVE RA TIO
Chart 16.If the adjustment could be made, it would reduce the
spread between the three ratios slightly and also the estimated effects
of redistribution.
The first and more important impression to be gained from Chart
16 is how close together the two series remain over the entire period.
Use of the 1914 distribution of deposits throughout for the weights
results in an only slight divergence between the two series, even at
the beginning and end when the 1914 weights are least likely to apply
so well.Since the reserve ratios for the three classes of banks differ
considerably in level, the result indicates that shifts in deposits among
those classes have been fairly small.
The main divergence between the two series is in 1933—40, when the
actual ratio rose 17 percentage points and the hypothetical ratio only
12, a reduction of almost one-third of the increase in the actual ratio.
The divergence implies a shift of deposits to the classes of banks with
higher reserve ratios, namely, central reserve city and other reserve
city banks.Surprisingly enough, most of the divergence came well
after the period 1930—34 when, as Table 16 and Chart 15 show, most
of the shift in deposits in favor of member banks at the expense of
nonmember banks occurred.Part of that shift was tentatively at-
tributed to a high rate of suspensions among small banks. The shift
in 1933—40, shown in Chart 16, in favor of reserve city member banks
at the expense of country member banks was clearly not due to a
wave of suspensions among country banks.Indeed, the number of
licensed country member banks increased sharply from 1933 to 1934
and then remained roughly constant through 1940.Obviously,
country banks gained less than their usual share of the increase in
total deposits.Country banks, of course, deposited most of their
excess funds, which typically pile up during business depressions,
with correspondent city banks; that transfer shifted the distribution
of interbank deposits in that direction.But the figures underlying
Chart 16 exclude interbank deposits between member banks, and such
transfers from nonmember banks were too small to make much dif-
ference.
The major factor accounting for the redistribution was a shift of
deposits held by the public to reserve city member banks, the largest
shift being to central reserve city banks in New York City. The im-
portance of those banks is shown by the increase in deposits held byTHE RESERVE RATIO 163
thepublic from 1933 to 1940 for the various classes of member banks:
for country banks the increase was 78 per cent; for noncentral reserve
city banks, 84 per cent;for Chicago banks, 88 per cent; and for
New York City banks, 114 per cent. The figures indicate that a large
share of the cash balances accumulated by the nonbanking public
during the 1930's gravitated to New York City. The shift, to be sure,
encompassed a small part of the total balances accumulated. The
increase in deposits of noncountry member banks in excess of the 78
per cent increase in country member bank deposits—which serves as a
basis for comparison—accounted for but 12 per cent of the total
increase in member bank deposits, 1933—40. Nevertheless, the effect
of that shift on the member bank reserve ratio and thence on the stock
of money was striking (see Chart 16).
The difference between the two series in other periods is less pro-
nounced but still revealing in the enlarged scale at the bottom of the
chart, which also shows the conformity of the difference series to
reference cycles.The difference series typically rises during con-
tractions and falls during expansions, indicating a shift of deposits to
city banks when business lags and to country banks when business
prospers. Two of the strongest exceptions to that pattern can perhaps
be explained by other factors. The rise in the difference series during
the 1933—37 reference expansion, just discussed, may have been due
to the depressed conditions of the economy throughout that period
leading to the usual behavior for contractionary periods. The rise
during the 1917—18 inflation reflected the character of the early
growth of the Federal Reserve System.Spread of membership to
state banks occurred only after 1917. The rise in the difference series
after 191 7 and its subsequent decline suggest that the first state banks
to become member banks swelled the ranks of reserve city banks rather
than of country banks and that subsequently the numerical pre-
ponderance of new entrants swung the other way.
Despite the exceptions, the cyclical behavior of the difference
series exhibits high inverse conformity to cycles. A simple test confirms
this. When the items in the series nearest to monthly peaks and troughs
of reference cycles are selected and the successive directions of change
in the items listed, there are two expansions and two contractions in
which there was no change, thirteen out of the remaining sixteen ex-
pansions in which the change was downward, and eleven out of the164 THE RESERVE RATIO
remaining sixteen contractions in which the change was upward.
This count omits the incomplete reference contraction at the beginning
of the series but includes every phase thereafter from 1879 to 1954,
eighteen reference cycles in all.These results are statistically sig-
nificant:the 24 "correct" moves in 32 cyclical phases (omitting
the four cases of no change) would occur by chance less than 5 per
cent of the time. Deposits tended to shift in favor of city banks during
contractions and in favor of country banks during expansions with
considerable regularity. Such a shift probably accounts for the relative
decline of other commercial banks in severe contractions, a phenom-
enon commented on in the preceding subsection, since those banks are
chiefly located in country districts.8
An explanation might be that one group of money holders whose
cash balances undergo greater cyclical fluctuation than the aggregate
does keeps most of its holdings at reserve city banks. Such a group
might be large business corporations and financial intermediaries most
of which have their main banking connections in large cities.
The largest movements in the difference between the actual and the
hypothetical ratio, except during 1933—40 and the subsequent period
of return to normal levels, amounted at most to 2 percentage points
and even then did not coincide with the major movements in the reserve
ratio.In the analysis of the reserve ratio, we can ignore the effects
of shifts in deposits among national-member banks in different reserve
classifications.
SHIFTS BETWEEN TIME AND DEMAND DEPOSITS
A third change in the distribution of deposits which affects the reserve
ratio is shifts between time and demand deposits. The Federal Reserve
Act imposed substantially lower reserve requirements on the former
than the latter. While the National Bank Act had made no distinction
between different kinds of deposits, many state banking statutes did
even before 1914. Aside from statutory requirements, banks no doubt
view time deposits as needing only small cash reserves.
8Theeffect of these shifts is to make New York City banks tighter than the rest of
the banking system during business expansions, and easier during contractions.
Insofar as Federal Reserve countercyclical policy is based on the condition of New
York City banks, the policy will, because of the deposit shifts, be too easy for the










Ratio of Time to Total Deposits at Goinmercial Banks, Annually, 1914—6'O
Source: Same as for Chart 2 and Table F-I.
The direction and magnitude of such shifts from 1914 to 1960 is
shown by the ratio of time to total deposits at all commercial banks
The ratio rose sharply from 1919 until 1931, then fell
with comparable rapidity until 1943, and rose again but more slowly
thereafter.After 1956 it rose rapidly. The wide fluctuations in the
ratio over those forty-six years has elicited considerable comment.
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deposits to the time classification. The rise during the l950's has been
attributed to the growing competition of other financial assets with
demand deposits as a form of wealth holding. Side by side these two
explanations of different periods point up the main difficulty of inter-
preting this ratio: movements may reflect a shift between time and
demand deposits or between one of them and other financial assets,
either of which could be primarily responsible.
A broader perspective on the behavior of time deposits may be
obtained by a comparison, not only with demand deposits, but also
with a larger group of liquid assets that seem to be especially close
substitutes. As a first approximation, we may treat time deposits, at
least for recent decades, as almost entirely a repository of long-term
savings, in contrast to the use of most checking accounts for current
transactions. This is the way banking laws view time deposits.It is
the rationale for low reserve requirements and delayed withdrawal
privileges. Some evidence that time deposits are in fact mostly long-
term savings is that, since at least 1940 and very likely much earlier,
virtually all have been classified as savings accounts (restricted by
law to individuals and nonprofit institutions) rather than time cer-
tificates of deposit.Savings accounts arc relatively small in average
amount (presumably mostly held by people of moderate means), and
they have low turnover compared with demand deposits.9Indeed,
their turnover is not much above that of savings accounts in other
financial institutions.Accordingly, the main substitutes for time
deposits, in addition to demand deposits, appear to be U.S. savings
bonds and savings accounts at mutual savings banks, savings and loan
associations, credit unions, and the Postal Savings System. The cash
value of life insurance is sometimes also included, but it seems an
altogether different and more distant substitute.
For Chart 18 total liquid assets are defined as the deposit liabilities
of the above institutions (excluding insurance companies), plus corn-
°See"Time and Savings Deposits at Member Banks," Monthly Review, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York,July 1960, pp. 118—23; Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1958,
pp. 422—426;G. Garvy, "The Velocity of Time Deposits," Journal of American
Statistical Association, June 1953, pp. 176—191; W. R. Burgess, The Reserve Banks
and the Money Market, New York, 1946, p. 38; and S. Shapiro, "The Distribution of
Deposits and Currency in the United States, 1929—1939," Journal of the American
Statistical Association, Dec. 1943, pp. 438—444. See also W. Welilirig, "Some Char-
acteristics of Savings Deposits," American Economic Review, Dcc. 1940, pp. 748—758.THE RESERVE RATIO 167
mercial banks. The chart shows the ratios of time and of demand
deposits to that total from 1896 to 1960, as well as to that total plus
U.S. savings bonds, separately, introduced in 1935. The figures for
time and demand deposits at national banks before 1914 are estimated
from reports made to the Comptroller of the Currency;'° the official
call reports of those banks did not require such data. The breakdown
between nonnational bank time and demand deposits was reported
for only a few states, and the estimates are particularly unreliable
before 1909. There was no standard definition of time and savings
deposits before 1914, when the Federal Reserve Act defined time
deposits at member banks as payable after thirty days. The earlier data
apparently include all deposits not payable immediately, and the new
definition excluded some previously classified as time deposits. The re-
sulting changes are minor, as the small drop in the ratio in 1914 attests.
A conceptual problem remains, however.Time certificates of
deposit, which have fixed maturities and are generally held by busi-
nesses or wealthy individuals, were a much larger fraction of total
time deposits in the earlier years than they have been since the 1930's.
Also, in the 1920's and perhaps earlier, some commercial banks
permitted checking against time deposits by the simple device of
keeping an extra passbook on hand at the bank and honoring a de-
positor's written order for payment as a check. The practice was
effectively prohibited by the banking acts of 1933 and 1935 by stip-
ulating that savings deposits can be paid only to the depositor or upon
presentation of his passbook.11Consequently, a sharp distinction
between demand and time deposits based on their present character-
istics encounters conceptual problems in earlier periods and loses
significance. What the closest substitutes for time deposits have been,
therefore, may well have changed over the years.
The ratios in the top panel of Chart 18 may be divided into four
periods:1896 to World War I, when the share of time deposits in
total liquid assets rose and the share of demand deposit stayed the
SeeAll-Bank Statistics,United States, 1896—1955, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 1959, PP. 18 arid 40.It presents a breakdown of time and
demand deposits separately for every year back to 1896. Years for which the break-
down is based solely on interpolations have been omitted in Chart 18. Estimates for
years before 1907 were based on a survey made by the Comptroller in 1907 and are
therefore subject to considerable error.
11SeeFederal Reserve Bulletin, Nov. 1938, pp. 969—970; and Mar. 1961, p. 288.CHART 18
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with no mutual savings banks. Indeed, nonnational banks in western
states had virtually no increase in time deposits relative to total deposits
over the period.
Why nonnational banks had proportionately so much larger time
deposits than national banks had, as the table shows, is understandable.
As noted, some state reserve requirements were lower for time than
for demand deposits even before 1914, giving nonriational banks an
TABLE17
RATIO OF TIMEDEPOSITSTO TOTAL DEPOSITS AT
SELECTED AREAS, 1896 SAND
(per cent)
1896 1914
States with mutualsavings banks
National banks 3.1 16.9
State and privatebanks 24.1 31.1.
States without mutual savings banksa
National banks 6.6 22.4
State and private banks 45.4 50.1
States west of the
National banks 7.8 22.1
State and private banks 52.0 52.3
Source:Compiled from datain All—Bank Statistics.
aIldDistrict of Columbia.
bEXClUdCSMinnesota.
incentiveto expand them. Even by 1896, time deposits comprised a
third of the total deposits at those banks. What is strange (assuming
the data are correct) is that national banks pursued the savings business
when they apparently derived no comparable advantage from lower
reserve requirements. Perhaps the business became especially profit-
able and inviting when interest rates on bank assets started to rise
around 1904 following a long decline (see Appendix E).National
banks could expect to attract—and did—a fair share of that business
with the advantage of offering all banking facilities at one place.
While the rate of interest paid by commercial banks on deposits
appears to have risen after about 1904 (Appendix E), it rose also on
mutual savings bank deposits;there is no indication that the dif-
ferential rate changed appreciably.Apparently there was a ready
market for time deposits in the period, and a higher differential rate
was not necessary.THE RESERVE RA TIO 169
Source
UPPER PANEL
Demand and time deposits at commercial banks and mutual savings bank deposits:
June figures, 1896—1914, from All Bank Statistics; Dec. figures, 1914—60, from Friedman
and Schwartz, A Monetary History, Table A-I.
Postal savings: June figures, 1911—14, and Dec. figures, 1914—60, from A Monetary
History.
Savings and loan shares: Raymond Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States,
Vol. I, Princeton, 1955, p. 441, TableJ-5, col. 2; and Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Credit union shares arid deposits: Goldsmith, Study of Saving, p. 427, Table L-40,
cols. 2 and 4; and Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
U.S. savings bonds:Dec. figures from Banking and Monetary Statistics, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1943, and FRB.
LOWERPANEL
Savings and loan association rate: Goldsmith, Study of Saving, p. 447, Table J-lI,
col. 2, and FHLBB (data not available before 1940).
Mutual savings bank rate: Table E-2 (data not available 1935—44).
Time deposit rate: Table E-1.
Demand deposit rate:Interest paid, if any, minus service charges, divided by the
average level of deposits for the year (no deduction for losses due to defaults). Rate
paid or charged in Table E-1 (for 1933 only, difference between rate paid and
charged).
Note: The breaks in series of upper panel indicate the new definition of time
deposits for member banks beginning December 1914. Total liquid assets are demand
and time deposits at commercial banks, deposits at mutual savings banks, postal
savings, savings and loan shares, credit union shares and deposits, and (in dotted line
only) U.S. savings bonds.
same overall; World War I to 1929, when the share of time deposits
gained and that of demand deposits declined;1929 to 1943, when
the movements of the preceding period were reversed; and 1943
to 1960, when time deposits rose and demand deposits fell in relative
position during the first part and again during the latter part of the
period.These movements swamp the small cyclical ripples in the
series, which suggests that cyclical shifts among these assets were of
minor significance. Let us examine each period in turn.
1896 to World War I. The rise in the share of time deposits occurred
mainly at the expense of mutual savings banks, which were then the
chief competitor of commercial banks for savings deposits.Since
banking spread rapidly through the West, it is tempting to conclude
that commercial banks took over much of the savings business in the
expanding areas simply because mutual savings banks were not
chartered there. Table 17 shows, however, that this explanation is
inadequate. The ratio of time to total deposits in commercial banks
increased as much from 1896 to 1914 in states with mutual savings
banks as in states without them or as in western states as a group,THE RESERVE RA rIO 171
In any event, demand deposits held their share over the period as a
whole and so, on this evidence, do not appear to have been affected
by the growth of time deposits.
World War I to 1929. The rising share of time deposits during the
was attributed by an official committee of the Federal Reserve
Board to transfer of deposits from the demand to the time classifi-
cation.12 Banks had an incentive to encourage such transfers because
of the previously mentioned lower reserve requirements for time
deposits.Allegedly, national banks were the chief culprits, since
some state member banks operated under such differences in reserve
requirements earlier. Banks supposedly induced depositors with large
checking accounts to hold part of their funds in time accounts at
higher rates of interest.'3 Although the differential rate on time over
demand deposits appears not to have risen, depositors may still have
been willing to make such transfers on assurance that the funds were
safe and readily accessible when needed. The advent of the Federal
Reserve System seemed to enhance the ability of banks to avoid those
stringencies which previously had delayed the payment of time (and
demand) deposits.
The view is plausible that some growth of time deposits was at the
expense of demand deposits because of the above-mentioned legal
changes. Time deposits in national banks grew from a much lower
level and more rapidly relative to demand deposits during the l92O's
than they grew in nonnational banks. According to Chart 18, the share
of total demand deposits fell from 1914 to 1929 (ignoring the temporary
rise during World War I) just over 10 percentage points, almost
exactly the amount the share of total time deposits rose.Yet, the 10
per cent shift amounts to 25 per cent of demand deposits and over
30 per cent of time deposits held by the public in 1929—a very large
amount all to be explained by transfers induced by banks. There is
also some direct evidence weakening this explanation. The growth
of time deposits did not lodge predominantly in large city banks,
where large time deposits were concentrated and most of the alleged
transfers might be expected to occur. The number of time depositors in
national banks grew commensurately with the growth of such deposits,
'2FRB, Nov. 1938, pp. 969—970; and Mar. 1961, p. 288 and Report of Committee
on Bank Reserves of the Federal Reserve System, 1931, pp. 14—15.
13 Allegedly there were also some illegal misclassifications of deposits, especially in
New York City. See the remarks of Irving Fisher in Econometrica, Apr. 1946, p. 179.172 THERESERVE RATIO
andtheir average increase was not more than the increase in other
commercial banks, contrary to expectations if depositors with large
accounts were responsible. Interviews with bankers suggest that large
transfers were minor.Small transfers were undoubtedly important
in total, but they appear unable to explain the entire movement
shown in Chart 18.Commercial banks, and particularly national
banks, succeeded in capturing, one way or another, an increasing
share of the savings business during the l920's, as in the preceding
two decades, and not entirely at the expense of demand deposits.14
Time deposits rose relative to demand deposits during the period
also in many Western European countries including Great Britain,'5
where differences in reserve requirements were not involved.Since
there is no evidence of widening interest rate differentials, the ex-
planation might be that prosperity and financial stability, character-
istic of that decade in the United States, lessened the demand for
checking accounts relative to all other assets. That is to say, the list
of liquid assets used for Chart 18 needs to be broadened to include other
kinds of assets for judging movements in demand deposits. (Whether
the movement in the British ratio occurred for the same reason may
be questioned, however, since her economy was depressed during
much of the l92O's.) The post-World War II period is similar, but
U.S. rate differentials clearly widened then (see below), which makes
a direct comparison of the two periods for this country of little
value.The full explanation of these data for the 1920's remains
uncertain.
1929to 1943. Forthis and the next period, changes in interest rate
differentials were large and seem to have played a major role (see
the bottom panel of Chart 18).In the early 1930's the share of both
time and demand deposits fell mainly because of the worsening finan-
cial situation, which damaged commercial banks more than other
'4Forthe evidence cited in the second half of this paragraph, see D. R. French,
"The Significance of Time Deposits in the Expansion of Bank Credit 1922—28,"
Journal of Political Economy, Dec. 1931, PP. 759—782.
An additional factor of uncertain importance is that the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency ruled in 1919 that national banks could actively promote savings deposits.
Previously, doubt existed whether national banks could legally use the term "savings
deposits," though they could pay interest on deposits; see Instructions and Suggestions
of the roller of the Currency Relative to the Organization, Etc. of National Ban/cs, 1907
(Treasury Doc. 2476), p. 41, and subsequent editions.
15SeeElmer Hartzel, "Time Deposits," Harvard Business Review, Oct. 1934, pp.
33ff.; andJ. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Money, Vol. II, 1930, Chap. 23.THE RESERVE RA TIO 173
financial institutions. The continued fall in the share of time deposits
in the later 1930's and early l940's may be attributed partly to a
reversal of the transfers induced during the 1920's and now prohibited
by the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, but no doubt largely to the
growing rate differential between time and other savings deposits.16
During the war, U.S. savings bonds also became a strong competitor
for all deposits.
The relative position of demand deposits, on the other hand, re-
covered after 1933 and grew appreciably until 1942 (or 1943, excluding
savings bonds). The rise would appear smaller if we were to include
currency among liquid assets.Nevertheless, the contrasting behavior
of time and demand deposits is striking. No doubt some of the dif-
ference reflects a shift from time to demand deposits; although the
rate paid on demand deposits was negative, the differential between
the two actually declined after 1934 until 1944.Earnings on bank
assets fell and could no longer justify a high rate on any deposits.
The same was also partly true of assets of other financial institutions,
however, and demand deposits probably gained at the expense of all
assets in the economy (except for currency and probably U.S. savings
bonds). Undoubtedly, too, special wartime factors were also involved
in the large accumulation of demand deposits.
1943 to1960.The rate differential between time and other savings
deposits widened from 1947 to 1955, then narrowed, and the share of
time deposits seems to have followed these movements, though their
over-all share did not change much. The rapid growth of savings and
loan associations in the postwar period, which seems to reflect the
improvement in 1950 of the federal insurance for their shares,'7 has
encroached to no apparent extent on time deposits (except perhaps
16Confirmingevidence of interest-rate effects by regression analysis is given by
C. F. Christ, "Interest Rates and 'Portfolio Selections' among Liquid Assets in the
U.S.," Jvfeasurement in Economics: Studies in !vlathe1natical Economics and Economeirics in
Memory of Yehuda Grunfeld, Stanford University Press, 1963. The results of his careful
study should be viewed as tentative, because the data limited the analysis to the short
period 1934—59, during which rates first fell until after World \Var II and then rose,
providing only two fully independent observations of the effects of rate move-
ments.
17Congressset up the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation in 1934,
along with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for commercial banks. The
FSLIC expanded slowly at first and did not insure a majority of savings and loan
shares until World War II. A factor initially limiting the appeal of savings and loan
shares was that the terms of federal insurance, until changed in 1950, were less liberal
than those of the FDIC.174 THE RESERVE RA T1O
briefly in the early 1940's) but mainly on other assets, particularly
mutual savings bank deposits.18
Confusion is avoided by distinguishing between effects of changes in
interest-rate differentials—a movement along a demand curve for an
asset—and effects of changes in preference for an asset, given the
differential rate—a shift in the demand curve.The widely noted
long-run growth of nonbank financial intermediaries probably reflects
primarily shifts in the demand curve due to gradual revisions of the
public's estimate of their safety. Two important contributing factors
in recent decades have been extension of federal insurance to private
financial assets and the improved stability of the economy (absence of
severe contractions). Compared with adjustments to such shifts in the
curve, which may span many years, changes in interest-rate differentials
are likely to be minor and short lived unless, of course, they are main-
tained by legal ceilings. In the latter case, the regulated assets acquire
a permanently unfavorable return relative to all other assets.
The declining share of demand deposits very likely reflects the
substitution of a wide range of assets, no one of which can be identified
as particularly important. No doubt the decline to 1949 represents
simply a dispersal of large holdings accumulated during the first
part of the war.It is the decline since 1951 reflected in the post-
war rise in the velocity of money which has received so much attention.
The decline in share (or rise in velocity) more or less coincided with
generally increasing rates of return on time and savings deposits;
since World War II and until about 1951 those rates had drifted
upward, but slowly.It was in March 1951 that the Treasury—Federal
Reserve Accord began a gradual rejuvenation of the conventional
monetary measures for restraining credit.By September 1953, the
Reserve System's policy of supporting the prices of U.S. bonds was
explicitly abandoned, and market interest rates thereafter moved
upward more sharply. Inasmuch as demand deposits have continued
to bear a negative rate because of service charges, the decline in their
share is widely attributed to the more attractive yields on alternative
ISSeethe discussion in Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary
History of the United States, 1867—1960, Princeton University Press for Nationa] Bureau
of Economic Research, 1963, Chap. 12.See also "Time and Savings Deposits in the
Cycle," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June 1962, PP. 87—88,
and W. C. Freund, "Financial Intermediaries and Federal Reserve Controls Over
the Business Cycle," Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, Feb. 1962, pp. 21—29._ _
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assets.Whether changes in the rate differential are a major or a minor
part of the explanation, however, is not clear.
The foregoing discussion of Chart 18 reviewing the interpretations
usually proposed for those periods rests upon the appropriateness of
the list of assets selected as close substitutes for time and demand
deposits. That list, with minor variations, is now so commonly used
in such discussions that its tentative nature needs to be stressed.Al-
though these assets are all likely to be close substitutes among them-
selves, they may well differ in degree of substitutability for other
nonliquid assets (like bonds or tangible assets). As a result, a shift may
occur from mutual savings deposits to time deposits and from demand
deposits to bonds, which appears to be a shift from demand to time
deposits. The shifts are not distinguishable in the Chart 18 series.
Such difficulties weaken the analysis, particularly of the liabilities of
financial intermediaries such as savings and loan associations, which
may experience rapid growth, perhaps, because in portfolios of in-
dividuals they substitute as much for stocks and bonds as for time or
demand deposits.The analysis implicitly assumes that the liquid
assets listed are much closer substitutes among themselves than with
other assets. While the assumption may have some validity for savings
deposits held by individuals, it seems insupportable for most demand
deposits, for which many other assets may be important substitutes.
Without more evidence, an analysis of relative movements in time and
demand deposits is highly tentative.
The causes aside, the effects of the large shifts between time and
demand deposits on the member bank reserve ratio are given in Table
18. The proportion of time deposits to total deposits at member banks
has had a greater amplitude of variation than the proportion at other
commercial banks has, and the difference between the required
reserve ratio for demand and for time deposits is smaller for other
commercial banks than for member banks (demonstrated in Table
20, below). Consequently, the effects of those shifts on the ratio for
all commercial banks, if computed, would be smaller than the effects
found for member banks alone.
The estimates in Table 18 were found by adjusting the reserve
ratio for each of the three reserve classes of member banks for the
effect on required reserves of shifts between demand and time deposits.
Required reserves were increased by the amount legally released by a176 THE RESERVE RATIO
TABLE18
CHN'4CES IN THE MEMBER BANKRESERVERATIO, SELECTED PERIODS, 1914—55
Perioda Actual
(1)
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Source:Data underlying Tables F—li and F—13.Data for 1914 and 1917 cover
national banks only.Data for the small number of state menber banks before
1918 are not available.
Note:n.c. not computed.
aEfld of June except 1914, which is Dec. 31.For selection of periods, see
text.
bc01. 2 isa weighted average of changes in the reserve ratio for each class
of member banks, assuming the ratio of tine deposits to total deposits had re-
mained the sane as at the beginning of the period.The weights are the pro-
portion of total member bank deposits at each class at the beginning of the
period.(Using the end—of—period proportions would give almost the sane re—
suits.)An algebraic formula for the changes inDany one class of banks follows:
Let reserve ratio for demand deposits D be Rand that for tine deposits T
be R •Thenthe ratio R for total deposits is
RDD+ RTT
D+T
Anyshiftin the proportion of tine deposits to total deposits between years o
and twouldproduce the following change in the total ratio:
R0D+RTT RDD+RTT






The change in the ratio for all member banks iB the
ofbanks. The quantity R—itis measured as of the end
of the period, removing effects on the calculations of changes in requirements
over the period.Its value for central reserve city banks, other reserve city
banks, and country banks, respectively1was:.10, .07, and .04 for 1929 and
1931; .1775, .125, and .07 for 1940; .14, .14, and .08 for 1943; and .15, .13,
and .07 for 1955.
cComputed as follows:changes resulting from shifts in the proportion of
tine deposits to total deposits were eliminated from the reserve ratio for
each class of banks at the end of the period; the corrected ratios were then
averaged by the distribution of total deposits among the three classes at the
beginning of the period; finally, the resulting adjusted aggregate ratio was
subtracted from the actual aggregate ratio at the end of the period.THE RESERVE RA TIO 177
shift to time deposits and were decreased by the amount legally added
by a shift away from time deposits. A formula for their derivation is
presented in a note to the table.
Lines 1to 3 of the table for member banks cover the main shifts
between time and demand deposits in all commercial banks (Chart
17). The first period, December 1914 to June 1931, covers the full
duration of relative growth in member bank time deposits. The next
two periods cover the years of maximum rise or fall in the proportion
of time deposits at member banks (and all commercial banks; major
turns in the proportions for both classes of banks approximately
coincided). Column 2 shows the change in the ratio calculated as
resulting solely from shifts between time and demand deposits to be
compared with the actual change in the ratio in column 1. The changes
in column 2, ranging from less than 1 to less than 3 percentage points,
explain relatively little of the actual changes, except for the first
period when the actual change was small.
The shifts contributed even less to the two major movements in the
member bank reserve ratio since 1917 (see Chart 16), as shown by
lines 4 and 5 in Table 18. The relative growth of time deposits from
1917 to 1929 subtracted 1.5 points from the member bank ratio, and
their relative decline in the l93O's restored it.In the last period, the
addition accounted for less than one-tenth of the rise in the ratio. The
effect in the 1917—29 period was relatively larger but was offset in the
early part of the period by the shift in all deposits, previously discussed,
in favor of member banks (see Table 16). The entire decline of the
ratio in that period and most of its rise during the l93O's, therefore,
must be attributed to other factors.
Since Table 18 gives the effects produced on the required reserve
ratio, it does not necessarily show the effects produced on the actual
reserve ratio.Banks usually hold more reserves than required, and
presumably the excess depends on, among other things, the relative
amount of time and demand deposits, that is, there is one ratio for
demand deposits and another for time deposits.The difference
between the two ratios could be larger or smaller than that prescribed
by legal requirements, so long as aggregate reserves satisfy total re-
quirements.If the actual difference between the ratios for time and
for demand deposits is larger than the required difference, the effects
of shifts between time and demand deposits on the actual aggregate178 THE RESER YE RA TIO
ratio would be magnified as compared with the effects on the required
aggregate ratio; and, if smaller, the effects would be reduced. The
foregoing evidence alone does not show how the actual ratio was
affected by the shifts examined; we need to know how the desired
reserve ratios for the two kinds of deposits compared with the required
ratios.
Nevertheless, reserves above required amounts do not create a
serious problem in interpreting the results for most of the periods
covered in Table 18.Such reserves were quite low in all but one of
the terminal years. If reserves are not appreciably above requirements,
banks must follow changes in required ratios closely.In the 1920's,
for example, banks could not have expanded as they did without the
benefit of reduced requirements provided by the shift to time deposits.
The one exception is the second half of the 1929—40 period, when
reserves were far above requirements. Banks may have used part of
the excess reserves to satisfy the increased requirements arising from
the shift in favor of demand deposits. Had no such shift. occurred,
they might still have had the same aggregate reserve ratio. On the
other hand, they might have accumulated more reserves than required
against demand deposits rather than time deposits; the shift to demand
deposits would then have induced banks to augment their reserves.
If we assume all reserves in excess of requirements in 1940 were
held against demand deposits, we attribute the maximum possible
effect to the shift during that period, for this assumption gives the
maximum spread between the ratios for the two kinds of deposits and
so the maximum effect of the shift to demand deposits. An estimate
of the effect based on this assumption is +4.5, three times the estimate
given in the table. While probably an exaggeration, the larger estimate
is still a small fraction of the actual change in the ratio.
In conclusion, the effects of shifts between time and demand de-
posits were not large relative to the major fluctuations in the reserve
ratio. The effects appear relatively large only when changes in the
ratio due to other factors were small. This finding may appear strange
in view of the large fluctuations displayed by the proportion of time
deposits to total deposits and in view of the close attention paid to
rises in that proportion during the 1920's. The effects were small
because the largest shifts between time and demand deposits occurred
in country member banks. The difference between requirements forTHE RESER VE RA TIO 179
the two kinds of deposits at country banks has been about one-half
the difference at reserve city banks and even less than that at central
reserve city banks. Consequently, a large part of the shifts had little
effect on reserves. The importance of this point is brought out by a
comparison of the effects of those shifts with the effects of deposit
redistribution among the three classes of member banks.Col. 3 of
Table 18 shows the combined effect on the reserve ratio of the two
kinds of shift.In the 1920's their combination had slightly less effect
than the shift between time and demand deposits alone. There was
almost no redistribution of deposits among member banks during the
1920's (Chart 16).In the 1930's, however, the combined effect was
considerably larger than the effect of shifts between time and demand
deposits alone.'9 Shifts of deposits among banks, when they occur, are
potentially important, because of the diversity between the reserve
ratios for different classes of banks. Those differences are wider than
those between the required ratios for time deposits and demand
deposits of country member banks, where most of the shifts between
the two types of deposits have occurred.
SUMMARY OF SHIFTS IN DEPOSITS
Shifts in deposits in the period 1875—1955 were not in general
important.Shifts between demand and time deposits were large
but did not appreciably affect reserves. A radical geographical re-
distribution of deposits could produce sizable effects if it involved
banks having quite different reserve requirements, but only during
the 1930's did that occur on a scale sufficient to have an important
effect. The combined effect of the two kinds of shift, shown in column
3 of Table 18 for two major movements in the member bank reserve
ratio since 1914, probably had even less effect on the reserve ratios
of other commercial banks. Deposit redistribution probably had less
effect on nonmember than on member banks, because most of the
former fall in the lowest reserve classification.In addition, the pro-
portion of time deposits to total deposits fluctuated less in nonmember
than in member banks.
ID This statement needs qualification for the possible influence of excess reserves,
previously noted. The maximum possible effect of shifts between time and demand
deposits for the 1929—40 period, taking excess reserves into account, was estimated
to be +4.5, and the combined effect incorporating this estimate is +9.6. The shift
between time and demand deposits, therefore, may possibly have been almost as
important as the shift of deposits among banks.180 THE RESERVE RATIO
On the presumption that the magnitude of those effects on other
commercial banks was less than on national or member banks, we can
compute a range that brackets the combined effect of the three types
of shift on the reserve ratio for all commercial banks. Such a range is
TABLE19
SLU+IARY OF EFFECTS ON COt+IERCIAL BANK RESERVE RATIO OF SHIFTS IN














































bChange in actual ratio minus change in hypothetical ratio, assumingno shifts.
The latter ratio is a weighted average of ratios for national or member banks and
other commercial banks (from Table F—b, cols. 2 and 3), adjusted for the effect
of shifts recorded in cols. 3 and 4, above, where the weights are the distribution
of deposits between the two classes of banks at the beginning of the period
(Table F—9).
The change in the ratio for other commercial banks was assumed to be the same as
for national or member banks in deriving the right—hand figure and was assumed to be
zero in deriving the left—hand figure.Consequently, the right—hand figure equals
the sum of cola. 3 to 5, except for rounding errors, and the left—hand figure is a
weighted average of assumed changes in the ratios for the two classes of banks.
CFor national or member banks only (same as col. 2, Table 18).Whatever the
size of such shifts 1898—1906, in all likelihood they had small effects, because
the difference in reserve requirements between time deposits and demand deposits
was zero for national banks and probably not large for other commercial banks, as
a group.
dDifference betweena weighted average of ratios for three classes of menber
banks at the beginning and at the end of the period, where the Weights are the
proportionate share of deposits in each class.This average equals col. 3, minus
col. 2, in Table 18.
as for Table 16, col. 4, and therefore too large in absolute value
(see note d to that table).
shownin column 2 of Table 19 for three of the largest movements in
this ratio. The combined effect accounted for about 40 per cent, more
or less, of the actual rise in the ratio during the 1930's and was due
in part to all the distributional shifts. The same can be said about the
fall in the ratio from 1898 to 1906, with the qualification that whatever
shifts occurred between time deposits and demand deposits can not
be measured. In 1917—29 and other periods, the effects of those shifts
were much smaller in absolute terms, even though sometimes large_ w
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relative to actual changes in the ratio. There was no inherent reason
the shifts should work in the same direction, and they did not always.
In the 1917—29 period, the effect of the shift in favor of time deposits
was almost completely offset by the other two types of shift, and the
combined effect of all three on the ratio was negligible.
Cyclical shifts of deposits occurred between reserve city national or
member banks and other banks. A possible explanation is that de-
posits shift to large cities in recessions and away from them in pros-
perity, and that a majority of the banks in large cities are central and
other reserve city national or member banks. The phenomenon has
interesting implications for the relative demand to hold money of
different groups over the cycle and merits further study, even though
its effects on the reserve ratio were relatively small.
The largest differences in the ratios for individual banks are mainly
between those subject to different reserve requirements.For that
reason, shifts in deposits between such banks, on which the preceding
analysis was based, are likely to be the most important.
2. Legal Reserve Requirements
Legal reserve requirements give monetary authorities immediate
control over the capability of banks to extend loans. A substantial
increase in requirements with no compensating increase in high-
powered money or decline in the currency ratio may make the amount
of reserves above requirements—usable reserves20—temporarily neg-
ative and thereby force banks to contract earning assets in order to
accumulate funds. A reduction in requirements may present banks
with such large usable reserves that terms and interest charges on loans
are quickly lowered to take advantage of the new opportunities for
expanding earning assets.Historically, most new requirements have
been intended to influence the disposition of banks to expand credit,
but usually the size of the changes were small and the effects un-
dramatic.Sometimes they resulted merely from technical changes
20Themore attractive words "excess" and "free" have been usurped by common
usage to mean something else than usable in this context, so usable reserves is the
closest synonym. "Excess" reserves stand for actual balances with Federal Reserve
Banks less required balances. "Free" reserves stand for excess reserves less member
bank borrowings from Reserve Banks. Usable reserves, as defined here, equal excess
reserves plus vault cash.(From June 1917 to December 1959, no part of vault cash
satisfied member bank reserve requirements; since November 1960, all does.)182 THE RESERVE RATIO
in the definition of the deposit base on which required reserves were
computed. Reasons for the major changes in national or member
bank requirements are briefly reviewed below, after which the effect
of changes in requirements on the reserve ratio are examined. The
requirements for other commercial banks, also discussed below, varied
among states and are best summarized on an average basis for selected
dates.
MAJOR CHANGES IN NATIONAL OR MEMBER
BANK RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
From 1864, when the National Currency Act of the year before was
amended, until 1914, the legal reserve requirements for national
banks were changed only three times.First, the act of June 20, 1874,
repealed the reserve requirements for notes and provided that a
redemption fund equal to 5 per cent of the notes outstanding be
deposited with the Treasury, though the full amount of the fund could
be counted toward the reserve requirement for deposits.Second,
in 1902, U.S. deposits were exempted from reserve requirements.2'
Third, the Federal Reserve Act disallowed the inclusion of the 5 per
cent redemption fund for notes in legal reserves for deposits.
Since passage of the Federal Reserve Act, requirements have been
changed many times. The first occurred late in 1914 when national
banks, as members of the newly established Federal Reserve System,
had their reserve requirements reduced. While part of the reduction
helped member banks finance the compulsory purchase of capital
stock in Federal Reserve Banks without contracting other earning
assets, required reserves were intentionally reduced more than the
amount of those purchases to attract state banks into the System.
The act also stipulated that required reserves deposited at corre-
spondent banks, authorized under the national banking system, be
transferred gradually to Federal Reserve Banks over a period of three
years, after which only vault cash and deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks were to qualify as legal reserves.22 The effect of this provision
21Foran engaging recital of the circumstances surrounding that ruling, see A. Piatt
Andrew, "The Treasury and the Banks Under Secretary Shaw," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Aug. 1907, PP. 5 19—568. By later extensions that exemption lasted until
June 30, 1914, and was subsequently reinstated for the period Apr. 24, 1917, to Aug.
23, 1935. Nearly all U.S. deposits were again exempted during World War II.
22Thefirst instalment was payable entirely in gold or lawful money and the rest,
half in eligible paper. Also, in figuring requirements, deposits due from banks were
still deductible from deposits due to other banks, so that a fraction of interbank
deposits in effect counted as legal reserves.r W
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was gradual reduction of the amount of deposits member banks could
create per dollar of high-powered reserves.Six months before the
transitional period was scheduled to end, the 1917 amendment to
the act was passed specifying that all required reserves be deposited
immediately with Federal Reserve Banks. That provision would have
raised reserve requirements, but a further stipulation of the amend-
ment, designed to make it acceptable to member banks, lowered
the total amount of required reserves.Transfer of all reserves to
Reserve Banks aided the campaign of the Federal Reserve Board to
acquire as much of the domestic gold stock as possible, a step thought
necessary to meet the demands for credit expected to arise out of the
nation's entry into World War J•23
Therequirements instituted at that time remained in force until
August 1936, when the Federal Reserve took steps to eliminate member
banks' large holdings of excess reserves.Accumulated from gold
inflows in the preceding years of business recovery, they were viewed
as a potential source of inflation. The Banking Act of 1935 had en-
dowed the Board of Governors with new authority to set reserve
ratios at any level between specified minimums and maximums.
The August increase was the first of three which, together, raised the
required ratio byMay 1937 to the legal maximum for all member banks.
Since then, the Board of Governors has changed requirements many
times, though never by so much in so short a period.It reduced them
moderately during the severe business contraction in 1938 and then
in 1941 reinstated maximum requirements.During 1942, require-
ments for central reserve city banks were reduced to facilitate the
continued active participation of those banks in Treasury financial
operations. Requirements for the other banks remained unchanged
until 1948, when temporary legislation was enacted raising the max-
imum required level of reserves in an effort to stem the inflationary
consequences of wartime financial policies. The Board immediately
utilized the authority granted and put higher requirements into effect.
When the 1949 contractionary tendencies of business were recognized,
the Board rescinded over one-half the previous increase and, in June
when the special authority expired, the rest.Further reductions
followed in August and September of that year. Since 1949, require-
ments have been changed frequently but in small steps: from 1950
23SeeW. P. G. Harding, The Formative Period of Ihe Federal Reserve System, Boston,
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through 1955 the highest required ratio imposed exceeded the lowest
by only 4 percentage points for central reserve city banks and by only
2 for other banks.
Of the five largest changes since 1914, two worked to counter the
prevailing movement in the money stock: one raised requirements
during World War II; another lowered them during the 1949 con-
traction, though somewhat late. The other three were ill timed so far
as monetary stability was concerned.One, which was the largest
reduction in requirements ever granted at one time, was made during
World War I and enabled banks to aid in the inflationary financing
of Treasury deficits.The other two in 1936—37 and 1948, each a
series of increases imposed over a relatively short period, reversed
policies of credit ease which threatened to produce inflation but, as
it turned out, coincided with or slightly preceded downturns in the
economy.
CHANGES IN OF OTHER
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Reserve requirements for other commercial banks vary from state
to state and cannot be so handily summarized.Considerations of
short-run monetary stability have not played much part, as they do
to a large extent in changes of member bank requirements. For one
thing, requirements in many states can be altered only by their state
legislatures,24 rather than, as in others, by authority delegated to state
banking commissions.Consequently, state requirements as a whole
have been changed much less frequently than member bank require-
ments have and primarily for purposes related to long-run goals of
banking regulation.
Federal regulations have provided a standard toward which state
requirements have slowly gravitated.25Before the Civil War, only
Louisiana, in 1842, and Massachusetts, in 1858, passed laws specifically
requiring reserves against deposits.After passage of the National
Currency Act, the first state to impose reserve requirements was
Michigan, in 1871. New York State, often a leader in such matters,
24Twenty-fivestates as of 1951. See Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public
Debt, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1952, Part 1,
p. 471.
26Therest of this paragraph is based on R. G. Rodkey, Legal Reserves in American
Banking, Michigan Business Studies, Vol. VI, 1934, Chaps. 3 and 5.THE RESER VE RA TIO 185
did not act until 1882, though most members of the New York City
Clearing House agreed among themselves in 1858 to maintain a
minimum reserve of 20 per cent.As late as 1900, only seventeen
states had enacted such provisions.Thereafter, interest in the reg-
ulation of banking quickened, and all but six states imposed some
kind of restriction on deposit reserves before passage of the Federal
Reserve Act, and the six fell in line soon after.
Because of the great variety in state reserve requirements, the best
way to summarize them is to treat other commercial banks as a group
and compute total required reserves as a percentage of total deposits
by taking an average of state reserve requirements weighted by the
deposits of the commercial banks subject to them in each state. Con-
struction. of an average for frequent intervals would be tedious, and
has not been attempted. A summary of requirements for all states
has been published for ten different dates from 1909 to 1950, from
which a good indication of the trend in the aggregate reserve ratio
for those banks can be derived.
Averages for the ten dates are given in Table 20.Because of the
assumption that all state regulations apply to private banks—though
some may not—these figures may overstate the true average require-
ment including those private banks. The overstatement is negligible,
however, since deposits of private banks have accounted for a very
small part of the total covered by the table. A more important dif-
ficulty is that many states impose higher requirements on banks in
designated reserve cities than elsewhere. Since deposits in such banks
are not usually listed separately in state banking reports, their require-
ments could not receive separate weighting—New York excepted.
In that state, the wide variety of requirements for different classes of
banks and the large amount of deposits warranted special treatment.
For other states, two averages were made, one treating all banks as
though subject to the highest requirement in the relevant state, and
the other, as though subject to the lowest. The range so obtained and
recorded in Table 20 is, on the whole, fairly narrow and does not
obscure the main trends in the aggregate ratio. The bulk of banks and
deposits probably fall in the low reserve classifications, despite the
inclusion of most larger banks in the high classifications, and a correctly
weighted average would probably fall close to the lower end of the
range.186 THE RESERVE RA TIO
TABLE20
REQUIRED RESERVE RATIO OF OTHER Cct41ERCIAL BANKS, SELECTED YEARS) 1909—50
High—Powered Reserves
per $100 of:
















































































1909:Samuel A. Welidon, Digest of State Banking Statutes, National Monetary
Commission, 61st Cong., 2d sess., S. Doe.353,1910, Charts A and C (there are
a couple of negligible disagreements between this source and Rodkey, Legal
Reserves).
1913 and 1915:Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board for 1915, pp. 104—113.
1917:Federal Reserve Bulletin, Oct. 1917, pp. 768—796.
1924:FRB, Mar. 1924, pp. 154—181.
1928:FRB, Nov. 1928, pp. 778—804.
1930:FRE, Sept. 1930, pp. 570—597.
1937:FRB, Mar. 1937, pp. 188—219.
1944:Provisions of State Laws Relating to Bank Reserves as of December 31. 1944,
Board of Covernors of the Federal Reserve System (no date).
1950:Reserve Requirements for Non—member Banks, American Bankers Association,
Sept. 1950.(For 1951, not shown, see source in text footnote 24.)
Note:These ratios are averages of State reserve requirements weighted for
the quantity of demand, time, or total deposits held by the public at other
commercial banks in each state (from All—Bank Statistics).The lower end of the
range is an estimate using the lowest requirements in each state, and the upper
end, using the highest requirenents.Both sets of requirenents were averaged
by the same weights, except for New York State, for which a weighted average
was computed for the different classes of banks.
The exact date within each of three years to which the requirements apply is
Dec.31. for 1944, Jan. 1 for 1937, and May 31 for 1930. For the other years no
exact date was specified, and the requirements for different states may have
been compiled as of different dates within the year given.Most state require-
ments change infrequently, however, and the averages generally apply to the
entire year for which they were computed.
aCash in vault only.
bCash in vault plus balances with approved banks.
Table20 helps to explain the difference between the total reserve
ratios for member banks and other commercial banks over the years.
The difference reflects a tendency of state regulations to permit banks
under state control to rely heavily for reserve purposes on total cash
reserves, that is, on balances at other approved banks as well as on
vault cash. The main reason for disallowing unlimited use of interbank
balances for reserves is, of course, that the practice permits banks to
create a pyramid of credit which can be very unstable. The FederalTi-fE RESERVE RATIO 187
Reserve System was founded to correct such weaknesses of the national
banking system and, accordingly, has authorized only high-powered
money for legal reserves of banks under its jurisdiction.Deposits at
nonmember banks have dwindled to a small share of the total, and the
resources of Federal Reserve Banks help to strengthen the financial
security of all banks. These considerations perhaps explain the growing
tendency of states to allow interbank balances to satisfy reserve require-
ments and so to produce a gradual reduction in high-powered reserve
requirements without a corresponding decline in total cash reserve
requirements of other commercial banks.
The smaller difference between required high-powered reserves for
time deposits and demand deposits in 1944 and 1950 stems from the
gradual elimination of vault cash as a required component of total
reserves, making required high-powered reserves zero;it may also
stem from a redistribution of deposits toward states with lower demand
requirements.(In 1950, the latter tendency actually reversed the
usual relation between requirements for the two kinds of deposits and
made the average high-powered requirement for time deposits greater,
even though in every state except Missouri required reserves were at
least as large for demand deposits as for time deposits.) The difference
between requirements for time and demand deposits in the early
years helps to explain why, during the 1920's, the increase in the
proportion of time deposits in member banks exceeded the increase
in that proportion in other commercial banks.Some nonmember
commercial banks had lower requirements on time deposits than on
demand deposits well before the Federal Reserve Act introduced that
distinction into the regulations for national banks; and the relative
advantage to other commercial banks in the lower requirement for
time deposits changed little during the 1920's.
As for the general movement of state reserve requirements over time,
Table 20 shows little change between successive dates, at least in
comparison with the sharp variations in member bank requirements.
As noted, changes made by individual states have been infrequent,
though often quite drastic and all at once. Since the actions of most
states were taken at infrequent intervals, no one group of actions had
much effect.Consequently, the average tends to smooth variations
in the individual components.
One of the largest changes in high-powered reserve requirements188
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High-Powered Reserve Ratio of Other commercial Banks,
Annually and Semiannually, 1875—1955
Source: Table F-lU, col. 3.
for total deposits of other commercial banks was a reduction of 1.3
percentage points from 1915to 1924.It corresponds with a decline
of 3 points or more in the total reserve ratio for those banks from
1916 to 1924, as shown by Chart 19.The decline in requirements,
therefore, can explain less than half the decline in the total reserve
ratio. The chart shows considerably more variation than could be
accounted for by changes in requirements. Moreover, most of the
changes in requirements were too small for their effects to show up, and
the data offer little evidence on reactions of banks to different levels of
requirements. For present purposes, we must rely on national-member
banks, whose reserve requirements have undergone wide variation.
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN NATIONAL AND MEMBER BANK
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
Table 21 shows the effects of all changes in national-member bank
reserve requirements greater than 1per cent of total high-powered
Per cent
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reserves (required plus usable reserves).All changes in the same
direction and in steps within a year of each other have been grouped
together and listed as a single change, except in lines 13 and 14. The
latter include some changes dated slightly less than a year apart but
nevertheless listed separately, because more than a year separates
the largest change in each group. Columns 1 and 2 give two measures
of the amount of reserves released or tied up by the change in re-
quirements.The second in column 2, expressed as a percentage
of deposits, gives the change in the required reserve ratio.These
measures are calculated for the call date immediately preceding the
date of the change in requirements, in order to exclude immediate
increases or decreases in deposits that may have resulted from banks'
reactions to the changes.This procedure, of course, ignores any
alteration in reserves made before the preceding call date, in anticipa-
tion of the change in requirements; changes were not announced
long in advance, however, and anticipatory actions were probably
minor.
Whether a change in the required reserve ratio affects the total
ratio depends on the reactions of banks. At first, the entire effect falls
on the usable reserve ratio, since there is no time to adjust total re-
serves. If banks allow their usable reserves permanently to absorb the
full change in requirements, no subsequent adjustment in total reserves
will occur, and the changes would have no effect on the total reserve
ratio. The total ratio would be affected if usable reserves do not fully
absorb changes in requirements, after time for adjustments. As one
possibility, banks might maintain their usable ratios at predetermined
levels wholly unrelated to their required ratio, by contracting non-
monetary assets to meet all increases in requirements and using ad-
ditions to reserves produced by decreases in requirements to acquire
such assets. Changes in the required reserve ratio would then have no
effect on usable ratios, except during a short-run adjustment period,
and would eventually produce an equal change in total ratios.
Columns 3—5 in Table 21 indicate whether, within a given time
span, the total or the usable ratio tended to absorb most of the his-
torical changes in requirements.These columns give changes in
semiannual series of the total, required, and usable ratios, from the
nearest June or December preceding the initial date of a new set of
requirements to the first June or December at least three months after190 THE RESERVE RATIO
TABLE21
EFFECTS OF ALL MAJOR IN RESERVE REQUIREMENTS ON NATIONAL OR
MEMBER BANK RESERVES, 1875—1955
Reserves Released (—)









of New Reserve High—Powered Total Required Usable
Requirements Reserves Deposits Ratio Ratio Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Oct. 4, 1902 —3 —0.6 n.c. n.c. n.c.
2. Jan. 14,1914 3 0.5 —0.1 0.8 -.0.9
3. Nov. 16, 1914 —13 —1.9 0.7 —3.0 3.7
4. Nov. 16, 1915—16 14 2.1 0.4 3.1 —2.7
5. June 21, 1917 —21 —3.1 —2.8 —4.5 1.7
6. Aug. 16, 1936 to
May 1, 1937 47 8.8 4.7 8.2 —3.5
7. Apr. 16, 1938 —10 —2.2 3.3 —2.0 5.3
8. Nov.1, 1941 8 2.4 —4.4 2.5 —6.9
9. Aug. 20 to Oct. 3,
1942 —9 —2.3 —5.7 —2.8 —2.9
10. Feb. 27 to Sept. 24,
1948 16 2.9 2.7 2.9 —0.2
11. May 1 to Sept. 1,
1949 —18 —3.7 —3.8 —3.7 —0.1
12. Jan. 11 to Feb. 1,
1951 11 1.8 1.6 1.9 —0.3
13. July 1to 9, 1953 —5 —1.0 —0.4 —0.4 0.0
14. June 16 to Aug.1,
1954 —7 —1.3 —1.3 —1.3 0.0
Source, by Column
(1): Beginning Nov.16, 1914, comprises seasonally unadjusted data for vault cash
and amounts due from Federal Reserve Banks; before that date, comprises vault
cash of national banks (National and Bank Call Reports).
(2): Comprises seasonally unadIusted data on individual and postal savings deposits
and net amounts due to nonnational banks (before 1914) or n,nmember banks.
Since the percentages are essentially a weighted average of changes in reserve
requirements for different classes of deposits, the weights are unlikely to
contain much seasonal variation (National and Member Bank Call Reports).
(3—5): Based on Table F—li and the seasonally adjusted series in Table F—12, de-
rived according to the same definition of deposits and reserves used cols.
1 and 2.The series are annual (call dates nearest Oct.1) until June 1914,
semiannual (call dates nearest June and Dec.) thereafter.
Note: The decrease on Oct. 4, 1902, and the increase on Tan. 14, 1914, were
the only changes in national bank required reserves from 1875 through Oct. 1914,
with one exception: the redefinition of net demand deposits on June 30, 1914, to
include U.S. deposits, which amounted to a change in requirements on that date
equal to only 0.8 per cent of reserves held and 0.1 per cent of deposits.
The table includes all changes for member banks through 1955 except a few in-
volving a redefinition of net demand deposits (see Banking and
tics, p. 66, n. 13).The date of the redefinition with the largest effects was
Aug. 23, 1935, when U.S. deposits were included, and demand deposits due from
other banks could be deducted from total demand deposits instead of from demand
deposits of other banks only, as before.The data are not available to make ex-
act calculations of the effects of such changes, but all were negligible. The
effect on reserves of the 1935 change was only about 0.6 per cent of reserves
held and 0.1 per Cent of deposits on June 29, 1935 (as derived from estimates
given in "History of Reserve Requirements for Banks in the United States,"
Federal Reserve Bulletin, Nov. 1938, p. 961).Exemption of U.S. deposits from
net demand deposits, beginning Apr. 24, 1917, freed less than 0.2 per cent of
reserves held.The effect of the wartime exemption of U.S. deposits in War Loan
Accounts after Apr. 1943 cannot be computed, because there were no such accounts
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NOTES TO TABLE 21 (concluded)
n.e.not computed, because data for the nearest available date after the
change were for a year later, hence not comparable with the 3-to 9—month period
used in later entries in the table.
Changes Covered, by Line
1—5: Cover national banks only; the required figures for state member banks before
1918 are not available.This restriction of coverage results in little error,
since there were few state member banks before passage of the act of June 21,
1917.
Represents the $35 riillion increase in required reserves owing to the Federal
Reserve Act's discontinuance of the inclusion in lawful reserves o. the 5 oar
cent redemption fund for national bank notes (sect. 20), enforcement delayed
by Comptroller until after call date on Jan. 13, 1914.
3—4; Cover changes in high—powered reserves required by the Federal Reserve Act.
Reserves held at central city or other reserve city banks, as previously allowed
for national banks, had to be gradually transferred to Federal Reserve Banks.
torequirements for vault cash and amounts held at Federal Reserve Banks, the
act provided for an immediate reduction when the System was established, shownin
line 3.(Calculations were made on the basis of deposits classified as demand
and time on Oct. 31, 1914; no allowance was made for possible transfers of de-
mand deposits to tine deposits when the lower requirement for the latter was in-
stituted.)This line also covers the $54 million reserves tied up when national
banks purchased Federal Reserve Bank stock equal to 3 per cent of their paid—in
capital and surplus, as required uPon becoming member banks.
The 1917 act required high—powered reserves to be increased through transfer
of balances at national bank reserve agents to Federal Reserve Banks, in three
semiannual instalments to begin 12 months after the Reserve Banks opened for
business.The transfers came between t.ov.16, 1915, and a year later, and their
effects have been grouped together in line 4.
5: Covers the change in requirements specified by the act of June 21, 1917, partly
amending the preceding provisions of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act. compari-
son is with the requirements in effect from Nov. 16, 1916, to June 20, 1917.
aComputed for the nearest call date preceding date of change in requirements on
the basis of reserves required against time deposits and net demand deposits.
bDatesare just before, and three to nine months after, imposition of new
requirements.
thefinal date of the set.By this method of selection, the end of the
period could be as little as three months or as long as nine after the
final date of the set. The derived period was selected because it never
overlaps a subsequent change in requirements. The varying length of
the period covered appears to be less serious for present purposes
than the presence of sizable cyclical and random fluctuations in the
required and usable reserve ratios, which may conceal tiny adjustments
to small changes in requirements. Such fluctuations account for the
discrepancy between columns 2 and 4.Only fairly large statutory
changes in requirements are likely to provide reliable evidence on
responses of banks to them.
A sharp difference in responses to the statutory changes in require-
ments before 1948 and after is suggested by columns 3—5. In the later
changes the usable reserve ratio returned almost exactly to its previous
level;in the earlier the usable reserve ratio absorbed a
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only since World War II, has the usable ratio been unaffected by
changes in requirements, an interpretation consistent with the three
changes from 1914 to 1916, when the usable ratio offset most of the
required change and the total ratio hardly varied. (The lack of semi-
annual figures before 1914 precluded an entry for the 1902 change.)
For the others before 1948, however, the evidence is mixed. The
usable ratio absorbed over one-third of the 1917 and 1936—37 changes,
two of the largest ever imposed. For the remaining three changes in
1938, 1941, and 1942, other factors were obviously at work. The
usable ratio changed considerably more than necessary to offset the
new requirements in 1938 and 1941 and changed in the same direction
the new requirements did in 1942. Usable reserves might offset either
part or none of a change in required reserves but would not—unless
for some other reason—offset more than the required change or
reinforce it.These three cases offer little evidence, therefore, on
responses of banks to changes in requirements.
One important factor in the postwar changes is the low level of the
average usable reserve ratio consistently maintained by banks since
World War II.This is evident in Chart 20, which shows the national
or member bank total, required, and usable reserve ratios from 1875 to
1955. Before the end of World War II, the usable ratio fell below 2.5
per cent and remained below that level through 1955. With low usable
reserves banks could meet increases in required reserves only by
increasing total reserves or reducing earning assets;there were in-
sufficient usable reserves to absorb higher requirements. The iow
usable ratio also indicates that banks had invested all but a minimum
amount of their usable funds intentionally and did not wish to hold
any more, for they quickly turned the reserves freed by the two postwar
reductions in requirements into earning assets and so kept the usable
ratio at the same level.In earlier periods, the usable ratio was at
higher levels and could absorb at least part of the new increases in
requirements, without the need for immediate increases in total re-
serves. This may explain why banks were slow to replace usable re-
serves absorbed by the earlier increases in requirements, and why they
were slow to take advantage of the earlier reductions in requirements.
One interpretation of this evidence is that banks are quick to offset
the effect of changes in requirements on the usable reserve ratio when
it is very low; moderate variations when it is fairly high do not cause194 THE RESERVE Ru TIO
concern, and usable reserves are allowed to absorb all or most of
increases in requirements. By this reasoning, failure of the decline
in total reserves to match the large 1917 reduction in requirements and
failure of their rise to match the large 1936—37 increase could be
ascribed to the high level of the usable ratio at those times.This
interpretation is implicit in the reasons given by the authorities for
most of the large increases: they were specifically designed to remove
the inflationary potential of large usable reserves rather than to induce
a rise in total reserves.26 The actions assumed that accumulation of
usable reserves results from the temporary unavailability of earning
assets banks are willing to purchase.It follows that an increase in
requirements then has no effect on the amount of total reserves banks
desire.
This interpretation is open to question. That the usable reserve ratio
can no doubt undergo larger variations when high than when low does
not necessarily mean that banks are indifferent to the level of those
reserves, even when large. An alternative interpretation is that banks
want to keep their usable reserves at desired levels and will offset all
but small variations in them—an explanation consistent with the
postwar and also the earlier changes in requirements, when they are
examined more closely. We may ask whether, at the time of the earlier
changes, the usable ratio was strongly affected by other factors and,
if they are taken into account, whether the total or the usable ratio
did absorb most of the new requirements in the long run. Chart 20
will facilitate such an examination, because it shows movements in
the usable ratio over the whole period and avoids the arbitrary limits
of periods used in Table 21. The large abrupt changes in the required
ratio which stand out in the chart reflect the imposition of new require-
ments. The other variations in this series, occasionally fairly large
especially before 1910, reflect redistribution of deposits.27
The 1914 increase in Requirements. The usable ratio had still absorbed
most of the increase six months later.After that, the usable ratio
series is swamped by the effects of the much larger reduction in
26Forstatements of policy on four of the increases when usable reserves were
unusually large, see the Annual Report, Board of Governors of the Federal Rcservc
System, 1937, pp. 2—5; 1941, p. 7;1948, p. 10; and 1951, p. 1.
27Thereare also minor changes of another kind in the required ratio: the deposit
base for computing required reserves differs slightly from deposits as defined for the
series in Chart 20, and the two need not maintain a constant proportion, though on
the whole they did.THE RESERVE RA TIO 195
requirements in 1914, so the effect of the earlier reduction cannot be
followed beyond six months in this series. That seems long enough,
however, for banks to adjust to such a small increase.Apparently
at that time banks were willing to see their usable reserves decline.
The 1914 Reduction and 1915—16 Increases in Requirements. Usable
reserves rose to absorb the reduction in 1914 and later fell to absorb
the increases in 1915—16. Banks kept their total reserve ratios roughly
constant and allowed the usable ratios to fluctuate. There seems to be
a special reason for the response to those changes: The Federal
Reserve Act not only provided for the 1914 reduction in requirements
but also scheduled increases somewhat greater in total amount to take
effect at six-month intervals beginning one year later. Member banks
made no noticeable short-run adjustment to the 1914 reduction prob-
ably in anticipation of the increases for which they prepared by saving
reserves released by the reduction. The after effects of the panic of
August 1914 were short lived and cannot explain the failure of the
reserve ratio to decline. Beginning in 1915, there were large additions
to high-powered money due principally to gold inflows. Such large
and sudden increases in bank reserves cannot be quickly invested and
may partly account for the rise in total and usable ratios in the year
following the 1914 reduction in requirements.
The 1917 Reduction in Requirements. The total reserve ratio had ab-
sorbed about two-thirds of that reduction in the first six months and in
the next twelve months had absorbed all of it, as Chart 20 shows. All
the usable reserves freed by the reduction were therefore converted
into earning assets, though the investment took a year and a half to
complete. Such a slow adjustment might suggest that banks were not
initially interested in investing all the freed reserves and only changed
their minds because of the high wartime demand for loans or perhaps
for other reasons.The slow adjustment can also be explained in
another way: Not only was the 1917 reduction in requirements large,
but it also removed vault cash from the category of legal reserves for
the first time. Banks probably relinquished this traditional first line
of defense cautiously and experimentally—a more plausible explana-
tion, since the usable ratio remained iow during the business recessions
of 1919 and 1921 and the ensuing decade.
The 1936—37 Increases in Requirements. The total reserve ratio had
absorbed only about half that series of changes in the six months196 THE RESERVE RATIO
following the last of them, but that was probably too little time to
allow a full adjustment. Those changes were by far the largest ever
imposed within a year's time.Chart 20 shows that the level of the
usable reserve ratio in mid-1936, just before the changes began, was
fully restored by the end of 1938, two and a half years later, a re-
covery suggesting that banks increased total reserves in order to
replace the usable reserves lost by the increase in requirements. This
is not conclusive evidence, however. Unlike the other episodes con-
sidered so far, the total reserve ratio had been rising sharply before
the 1936 increase in requirements and might have continued to rise
even if requirements had not changed.In 1936, business activity,
though rising, was still depressed, and interest rates were low. The
state of the economy, therefore, might explain the further rise in total
reserves. One interpretation consistent with the latter explanation is
that large usable reserves reflect the unavailability of suitable in-
vestment outlets;under such circumstances, banks hold the funds
idle, and an increase in requirements has no effect on desired levels of
total reserves. The increase, by immediately wiping Out part of the
usable reserves, will actually prevent an expansion of credit if in the
near future suitable investment opportunities arise.The official
explanation of the series of increases in 1936—37 is explicit on this
point:
Notwithstanding the fact that recovery [in 1936] was far from complete
and that there was still a large amount of unemployment, boom conditions
were developing in particular industries and boom psychology began to be
manifested. ...InAugust 1936 the Board of Governors had raised reserve
requirements for member banks by 50 per cent in order to absorb a part of the
$3,000,000,000 of reserves in excess of requirements held by member banks.
The Board's action was in the nature of a precautionary measure to prevent
an uncontrollable expansion of credit in the future.. ..Theincrease in
requirements had no perceptible effect on the credit situation, and money
rates continued low.
It was estimated that. ..,ifrequirements were increased by an additional
334 per cent, the banking system would still have the basis of a potential
expansion of more than $5,000,000,000 without recourse to the Federal Reserve
banks. ...Anincrease in reserve requirements would not diminish the large
volume of deposits of bank customers seeking investment which were ample
to assure the continuance of favorable money rates for capital purposes.28
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If banks raise their total reserve ratios in the face of stiffer requirements
that merely reduce usable reserves, we can not know for certain
whether their decision to bolster reserves was related to the new require-
ments. There are, however, other aspects of the behavior of member
banks and other financial institutions, particularly in that period,
which can shed light on the motives behind the increase in member
bank reserves.
Evidence on the effect of the 1936—37 increase is afforded by the
diversity of behavior of the usable ratios for the three classes of member
banks. In columns 1—3 of Table 22, there is a pronounced variability
in the usable ratio of central reserve city banks, much less in that of
reserve city banks, and relatively little in that of country banks. One
interpretation of this pattern is that, following the 1933 panic, central
reserve city banks, and to a lesser extent other reserve city banks,
fearful of further withdrawals, especially of deposits held by other
banks, built up their usable reserves in defense. Since country banks
held few deposits of other banks and could rely in emergencies on
their balances at reserve city banks, they looked upon large usable
reserves as less imperative. By this interpretation, the 1936—37 increase
in requirements accentuated the differences between reserve city and
country banks by striking deepest into the usable reserves of those
TABLE23
EFFECT OF 1936—37 INCREASES IN RESERVE REQUIREMENTS ON USABLE
RESERVE RATIOS,THREECLASSES OF MEMBERBPNKS
(percent)
























city 14.6 —1.6 19.0 127
Other
reserve
cities 10.3 —2.2 8.2 83
Country 8.0 +3.6 6.7 70
aSeas in Table 22.w
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banks in greatest need of them. Table 23 indicates that the required
increases wiped out more than all the usable reserves held by central
and other reserve city banks in June 1936, the first call date preceding
the increases.It is significant that by the middle of 1938 central
reserve city banks replaced somewhat more than their losses, other
reserve city banks somewhat less, while country banks, which lost less
than half their usable reserves, the smallest fraction of their losses.
Since the first and second classes of banks outpaced the third in ac-
cumulating reserves before 1936, the repetition of the pattern after
1936 is not readily explained without taking account of required
increases. Member banks appear, therefore, to have augmented their
reserve position from 1936 to 1938 mainly to replace the reduction
in usable reserves produced by the 1936—37 increases in requirements.29
This interpretation is strongly supported by the behavior of other
financial institutions. Table 22 also shows that reserve ratios for other
commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and savings and loan as-
sociations, none of which experienced important changes in reserve
requirements during the period 1929—40, behaved similarly to the
total and usable ratios of all classes of member banks, except in 1936—38.
The ratios for all institutions rose moderately during the contraction
in business of 1929—33 and then climbed markedly following the 1933
panic. In 1936—38, however, the member bank ratio is the only one
not remaining relatively constant. Then, after 1938, all rose again,
presumably in consequence of the continued low level of business
activity and, perhaps, further decline in interest rates. This evidence
indicates that only some factor specific to member banks—like in-
creased requirements—can explain the 1936—38 rise in their reserve ratio.
29ClarkWarburtori reached a similar conclusion; see his "The Turning Points in
Business Cycles," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov. 1950, pp. 547—548.See also
Friedman and Schwartz, A MonetaryHistory,Chap. 9; and Karl Brunner, "A Case
Study of U.S., Monetary Policy: Reserve Requirements and Inflationary Gold Flows
in the Middle 30's," .S'chweizerische Zeitschrififjir Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 94, 1958,
pp. 160—201. For alternative explanations, see M. D. Brockie, "Theories of the 1937—
38 Crisis and Depression," Economic Journal, June 1950, pp. 292—296, and G. Horwich,
"Effective Reserves, Credit, and Causality in the Banking System of the Thirties," in
Banking and Monetary Studies, D. Carson, ed., Homestead, Ill., Irwin, 1963.
A factor of some importance not mentioned in the text was the extremely large
inflow of gold from abroad during that period. The inflow probably made the actual
reserve ratio greater for a time than the desired ratio.This might account for the
actual ratio's being somewhat higher than usual, but could not explain the continual
rise in the ratio unless the size of the gold inflow continually became larger over the
period—which was not the case.200 THE RESERVE RATIO
Further evidence is provided by Canadian banks, which had no
change in requirements and maintained roughly the same total reserve
ratio through the second half of the l930's30, even though Canada
experienced the same sharp decline in output during 1938, and in
interest rates during the 1930's, as the United States did.
Increased requirements are not the only possible explanation of the
rise in the member bank usable reserve ratio, to be sure, since the
evidence does not rule out the possibility that it may have resulted
from continuing apprehension instilled by the 1933 panic and by the
business contraction from May 1937 to June 1938. Although central
and other reserve city banks unloaded an appreciable part of their
bond holdings beginning in early 1937—well before the downturn in
business and hence caused by the increase in required reserves31—they
were faced with a moderate reserve deficiency and had to contract
earning assets to meet it. The original intention might not have been
restoration of the usable ratio to its former level; the subsequent rise
in the ratio might have reflected the sharp contraction in business
during 1937—38.The behavior of the other financial institutions
covered in Table 22 seems inconsistent with this explanation, but
possibly not.Banks that owe large amounts to other banks may
adopt special rules for safe operation, especially in a period like the
five years following 1933, and cannot be compared with other financial
institutions. On these grounds, the evidence in columns 7—9 of the
table does not provide a norm for the behavior of central and other
reserve city member banks, which are particularly vulnerable at a
time of financial stringency and behave with prudent regard for their
central position in the banking structure.
Such an argument, whatever its validity, cannot be applied to
country member banks, however. The character of their liabilities is
much the same as that of nonmember banks. While the total ratio
for country banks did not rise so dramatically as that for all member
banks and did not differ so markedly from that for other financial
institutions, it did rise considerably from 1936 to 1938 when the ratio
for other commercial banks was virtually constant.This suggests
that the 1936—37 series of increases in requirements was the chief
See George R. Morrison, "Liquidity Preference of Commercial Banks," un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, June 1962, Chap. IV and
Table 4.1.
See Kenneth D. Roose, The Economics of Recession and Revival, New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1954, pp. 104—117.THE RESERVE RA TIO 201
factor behind the concurrent rise in member bank total reserves.
The 1938 Reduction in Requirements. If the foregoing interpretation
of the 1936—37 increases is correct, and if banks took more than a
year to adjust to them, then the 1938 reduction of just a year later
only served to speed the adjustment. The large rise in the usable
reserve ratio immediately following the 1938 reduction, therefore,
primarily reflects a continued adjustment to the preceding increases.
The further rise in the next two years, however, was much too large
to be ascribed to the preceding changes in requirements.Other
factors seem to have been present.
The 1941 Increase and 1942 Reduction in Requirements. The 1941 in-
crease wiped out usable reserves which member banks were already
working down. The downward sweep of the usable reserve ratio
hides whatever small effects the required increase in reserves may
have produced.It is not possible to say whether, had there been no
increase in requirements, the usable reserve ratio would have gone so
far down as it did in the following year.In any event, the increase
was nullified by the decrease less than a year later, in 1942, too soon
to judge at what level the usable ratio would have come to rest.
Nothing can be concluded about these two changes.
The effects on the usable ratio of changes in member bank reserve
requirements up to 1942 are therefore mixed. The 1914 reduction
was known not to be permanent; it was more than offset by the 1915—
16 increases, which the Federal Reserve Act authorized along with the
earlier reduction. The 1938—42 changes partly offset each other and
also occurred during violent swings in the usable ratio, large enough
to obscure small adjustments in the ratio.
The other three changes before World War II in 1917 and 1936—37
appear from the evidence presented to have been followed by off-
setting changes in the total reserve ratio with the return of the usable
reserve ratio to its former levels. The complete adjustments took well
over a year, perhaps because of the magnitude of the changes. Those
two were the largest ever imposed except the reduction in 1949,
which slightly exceeds the 1917 one as measured in column 3 of Table
21. The remaining change, the fairly small increase in early 1914,
was absorbed by usable reserves with no apparent attempt by banks
to adjust total reserves.It offers the only clear-cut exception to the202 THE RESERVE RA TIO
proposition that banks in due course largely offset the effects on usable
reserves of changes in requirements.
The post-World War II changes provide the clearest evidence, as
previously noted, in favor of this proposition. None of them were
accompanied by violent swings in the usable ratio which obscured
the reactions of banks to earlier changes.In 1948 and 1951, the
required increases appear to have reversed movements of steady
decline in the total reserve ratio.In 1948 the total ratio rose sharply
after requirements were increased and before the recession beginning in
the last months of that year could have initiated a large addition to
reserves. Moreover, the ratio fell back just as fast when requirements
were reduced in early 1949, well before the revival in business ac-
tivity beginning in October. The usable reserve ratio fluctuated very
little about a slightly falling trend, indicating that the rise in the total
ratio fully reflected the required increase in reserves. In the first half
of 1951, the increase immediately appeared in the total reserve ratio,
while the usable reserve ratio continued a slow unbroken descent.
The 1953 and 1954 changes, as well, though fairly small, show up
immediately in the total ratio.
For all the changes considered together, therefore, the evidence
suggests that the desired level of usable reserves—though not constant—
is usually independent of required reserves, no matter how large the
usable reserve ratio may be. When that ratio is fairly low, however,
the adjustment of the usable ratio to its former level is perhaps quicker.
While we might also expect a faster adjustment to reductions in re-
quirements than to increases of the same size—on the ground that to
spend excess funds is easier than to recall loans and sell securities—
there is no indication of that difference. The 1948 increase and 1949
reduction provide a useful comparison for this purpose: they were
about the same size and occurred during the middle of successive years;
the total ratio offset both changes in about the same length of time.
The apparent independence of the required and the usable ratios
might, of course, be coincidence: each change in requirements might
have coincided with a change in usable reserves in the same amount
and direction, undertaken for other reasons. If the change in require-
ments offset the predetermined change in usable reserves, the latter
would remain at the same level—but such an offset would be rare.
Most of the larger changes in requirements were made for specialTHE VE RA T1O 203
reasons unrelated to the predetermined level of usable reserves likely
to be desired by banks.Other changes were ostensibly made to
counteract business cycles, to be sure, but they have usually tended to
correlate negatively with desired changes in usable reserves. When
requirements have been raised to dampen a business boom, the desired
level of usable reserves was likely to be falling, and conversely. Hence,
while the effect of business cycles, as well as failure of banks to offset
effects of changes in requirements on usable reserves, would have
produced a negative relation between the required and the usable
reserve ratios, on the whole the data show no relation.
From a bank's point of view, required reserves apparently are not
reserves at all. They can be used only when a reduction in deposits
releases them.It is not required reserves but unrestricted holdings
of high-powered money and—except when all banks are under pres-
sure—balances at correspondent banks that provide the first line of
defense against heavy withdrawals.Under the national banking
system, the Comptroller of the Currency had authority to close a
bank that did not maintain its reserves above required levels except
for temporary lapses. There was nothing to prevent the suspension of
payments in time of heavy withdrawals except usable reserves and,
perhaps, crude expedients like issue of clearing house loan certificates.
Under the Federal Reserve System, an immediate penalty charge
must be imposed for reserve deficiencies, and the Board has always
limited borrowing to meet expected reserve deficiencies.32Banks
have therefore held reserves above requirements to meet unexpected
needs, and the existence of usable reserves has not meant that they
maintain their desired level of total reserves regardless of the part
tied up by requirements. By this interpretation, reductions in required
reserves provide banks with extra funds, which gradually become
invested in earning assets.Similarly, when required reserves are in-
creased, usable reserves are maintained at previous levels mostly by
contracting earning assets.
3. The Long-Run Decline in the Usable Reserve Ratio
Apart from changes in reserve requirements, the total reserve ratio
reflects large variations in the usable ratio.Although we cannot
82SeeRobert V. Roosa, Federal Reserve Operations in theMoneyand Government Securities
Markets, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1956, p.24.204 THE RESERVE RATIO
compute the usable ratio of other commercial banks, it undoubtedly
has a high correlation with the total ratio of those banks, because
their reserve requirements have changed only gradually. As indicated
in Table 20, the required reserve ratio declined slowly after about
1917 and, before that, probably rose gradually as more and more
states passed legislation dealing with reserves of state banks.Con-
sequently, the total ratio of other commercial banks shown in Chart
19 probably fell slightly slower than their usable ratio did up to World
War I and fell slightly faster thereafter.In general outline, its be-
havior appears to be similar to that of the usable ratio of national or
member banks shown in Chart 20.
TIMING OF THE DECLINE
In addition to the pronounced cyclical variations in the usable
ratios, both had a long-run trend, generally downward up to 1930,
upward to about 1940, and then downward again to 1955.If we
interpret the rise in the 1930's as a violent but essentially.short-run
cyclical movement, the trend appears at first sight to have been steadily
downward since at least 1875. Yet, cyclical fluctuations obscure the
movements before World War I;as a preliminary to discussing the
possible factors behind that trend, we should determine the periods
when the reserve ratio—omitting the effects of cycles—was declining
and when it was relatively stable.
The fairly steady declines in the ratios from 1875 until 1930 could
be illusory if the initial years were high for special reasons. The period
1875—79, for example, was one of severe depression and followed the
panic of 1873, both of which undoubtedly caused banks to hold larger
than usual reserves. Tojudge the trend properly, it is desirable to look
at the behavior of the series in earlier years, for which the reserve ratios
for national banks have been extended back to 1865 in Table 24.
The data for 1863 and 1864 do not appear comparable and are omitted.
A change in requirements accounts for the decline in the required
reserve ratio from 1873 to 1874 and seems to have affected the usable
ratio in the way such changes worked in later years: the usable ratio
first absorbed the full amount of the reduction in requirements and
then later began to work down to its previous level. The movement in
1873—74 is obscured, however, by the panic of September 1873 just
after the date of the entry for that year in Table 24. The ensuingTHE RESERVE RATIO 205
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1865 45.3 20.8 24.5
1866 48.2 24.4 23.8
1867 43.3 24.7 18.6
1868 40.2 23.1 17.1
1869 39.4 23.5 15.9
1870 35.8 22.9 12.9
1871 31.6 22.4 9.2
1872 28.6 21.2 7.4
1873c
27.4 21.1 6.3
1874 27.3 13.2 14.1
1875 25.0 13.1 11.9
8Ratio ofspecieand currency holdings (including small
amounts of state bank notes) to individual deposits, state bank
notes outstanding, and net amount due to nonnational banks.
National bank notes were excluded from the denominator to main-
tain comparability with the series for later years in Table F—Il.
There are reports on national banks back to 1863, but reserve
ratios for 1863—64 are not comparable with later years because of
the rapidly changing structure of the national banking system in
the first years of its organization.
bFor 1868 andafter, ratio of all required reserves (Annual
Report, Comptroller of the Currency) to denominator used for col.1.
For 1865—67, required reserves are not published and had to be es-
timated from statements of national banks for the three reserve
classifications.These earlier estimates are approximations only,
because there are no exact figures on permissible deductions from
aggregate liabilities to derive the base on which legal require-
ments were computed.It was assumed that "cash itams in process
of collection" were deducted with the tacit aporoval of the
Comptroller (see Annual Report, 1868, p. XXIII), but that permission
to deduct "due from banks" from "due to banks" not granted
until after 1867.
CDated Sept. 12 just before the panic of that year broke Out.
depression caused banks to hold for a time most of the subsequent
increase in their usable reserves provided by the change in require-
ments. Hence, the level of the usable ratio in 1875—78 was undoubtedly
above normal, and its level in the preceding years of prosperity will
be a more reliable indication of what it would have been in subsequent
years if business conditions had not taken a turn for the worse in 1873.
From 1865 to 1873, the usable ratio had fallen rapidly—seeming
to reflect a steep secular decline. Yet such a conclusion is questionable
because there are good reasons the usable ratio may have been206 THE RESERVE RATIO
abnormally high in 1865. During the Civil War, specie payments were
suspended and the currency depreciated; yet it was widely expected
that convertibility would be resumed soon after the end of hostilities.
Convertibility, when resumed, would produce a contraction in money
and prices to reverse the wartime inflation and to restore the currency's
prewar parity with gold. In anticipation of the storm, banks probably
bolstered their defenses by augmenting reserves. When, after 1865,
convertibility appeared not imminent and the country had weathered
the initial readjustments to peacetime conditions with little difficulty,
they no longer needed large reserves and proceeded to run them down.
Incomplete data on state banks for the period lend some support to this
interpretation. The total reserve ratio of reporting state banks33 rose
at the outbreak of the Civil War and then fell after the suspension of
convertibility.This series is not entirely comparable with the later
series on national banks, however, and the two series do not overlap
(the Treasury temporarily stopped collecting reports on state banks in
1863).
Though we cannot be certain, therefore, it is likely that the decline
in the usable ratio for national banks from 1865 to 1873 at least partly
reversed an earlier increase and so does not point to a long-run down-
ward trend.It seems best to ignore the evidence of the immediate
post-Civil War years and to judge the trend of the ratio from its course
after the 1860's. To abstract from cyclical movements, we may look
at its average levels during consecutive business cycles. The averages
shown in Table 25 cover periods between successive business cycle
peaks. The table shows a marked secular decline. The usable ratio
for all national banks shows a drop of about three-quarters from
1869 to 1907, reflecting a decline for all three classes. The total ratio
for other commercial banks also shows a decline, though not by so
much. Since reserve requirements for state banks were being extended
in the 1870's and 1880's, however, their usable ratios probably declined
about as much as that for national banks.
The decline in the ratios progressed in spurts.For all national
"Totalspecie holdings of reporting state banks, as a percentage of deposits and
bank notes outstanding on Jan. I, was 18.9 in 1860, 20.4 in 1861, 22.6 in 1862, and
17.3 in 1863 (see Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury. 1863, p. 233). The
usable reserve ratio, of course, was somewhat lower. Quarterly data for New York and
Pennsylvania banks also show the same general pattern. The earlier data need
adjustment, not done here, for the premium on gold in valuing specie holdings and
gold deposits.THE RESERVE RATIO 207
banks, there was little change up to 1887, then a sharp drop to a lower
level was completed by 1890 and was not extended further until after
1899. Country national banks, however, made substantial reductions
in their ratio earlier than city banks did. Central reserve city banks had
about the same ratio in the late 1890's as in the 1870's and did not make
TABLE25




















1869—73 n.e. n.e. n.e. 10.2 n.a.
1873—82 4.9 11.4 13.3 10.9 na.
1882—87 8.9 10.7 10.7 10.4 11.8
1887—90 4.5 5.8 8.2 6.9 12.3
1890—92 4.0 5.4 7.4 6.2 10.5
1892—95 11.4 6.4 9.3 9.1 11.4
1895—99 4.3 5.3 7.9 64 9.8
1899—1902 1.9 1.5 4.5 3.1 7.6
1902—07 1.5 1.3 3.4 2.5 6.7
n.e. not computed.
n.a. not available.
Note:Average levels computed from annual data (Tables 24 and F—li).
Beginning and terminal years were given one—half weight.
sear for which Oct.1 was nearest the peak month of National Bureau
reference cycles.
b
Table F—lO, col. 3.Undoubtedly declines less rapidly than the un-
available usable ratio for those banks.
most of their reductions until after 1899.(Since their ratios seem
abnormallyhigh in the mid-1880's and early 1890's, probably as a
result of panics, it is safer to ignore the exceptional levels.)For other
commercial l)aiIkS, as well, most of the decline since the 1880's came
after 1899. These observations of timing are based on average stand-
ings over business cycles.Some turns read from the annual series
differ; in particular, Charts 19 and 20 show that the large decline in
the averages after the 1899 reference peak actually began in 1897—98
in the annual series.
Some further declines in the average level of the ratios occurred in
the l92O's and 1950's (Charts 19 and 20).Since by the early 1900's208 THE RESERVE RA TIO
usable reserves had fallen about as low as they could reasonably go
without danger of becoming negative at the slightest jump upward in
the currency ratio, the possibility of further declines was severely
limited.
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS OF THE DECLINE
The decline is not the result of a quirk in the definition of the reserve
ratio used'.If we include in reserves balances due from other banks,
and, in deposits, gross (rather than net) balances due to other banks,
the ratios for national and for other commercial banks still show
secular declines of roughly the same total amount though a few years
later, around the turn of the century (see Tables F- 15 and F- 16), not
before.This suggests that the decline in the high-powered reserve
ratio of national banks from 1887 to 1899, before the all-inclusive
ratios show much decline, reflected a shift to interbank reserves.
The decline in the all-inclusive ratios after 1899 was greater for country
banks than for the other two classes of national banks, suggesting that
country banks, having relatively less high-powered reserves to begin
with, went further than other national banks in replacing interbank
balances with other earning assets. The ratio for reserve city banks,
on the other hand, rose slightly during the 1890's and early 1900's,
in contrast with the decline in their high-powered reserve ratio, in-
dicating that they substituted interbank balances for high-powered
reserves.
The all-inclusive ratios for all classes of banks fell again and more
sharply after the Federal Reserve Act was passed;since the act
reduced reserve requirements and ended use of interbank balances as
legal reserves, the reduction in total reserves fell mostly on those
balances. The all-inclusive ratio for other commercial banks also fell
during the l920's, but not much more than their high-powered reserve
ratio did, since state requirements showed no tendency to remove
interbank deposits from the list of legal reserves. The ratio for mutual
savings banks exhibits no decline until after 1915 (see Table F-l7).
Hence the decline around 1900 apparently applied to commercial
banks only. All our ratios exclude U.S. deposits, but they were usually
too small to make any difference. At times, such as during World
\'Var II, U.S. deposits were large, but they were conveniently exempted
from reserve requirements and not withdrawn except with advanceTHE RESERVE RATIO 209
notice; consequently, they probably had little effect on the reserve
ratio.
Interest Rates. A possible explanation lies in the movements of in-
terest rates. Banks hold usable reserves as an alternative to earning
assets and will tend to balance the security provided by $1 of cash
against the income derived from $1 invested. The higher interest
rates are, the greater the incentive is to get along with less cash; con-
versely, when interest rates are low, the advantage of holding large
cash reserves appears high compared with itscost.Presumably,
short-term rates approximate bank charges on call money and on
commercial loans, and long-term rates reflect the prices of most bonds
that banks invest in.Hence banks are likely to be sensitive to the
entire range of rates.
For practical purposes one long and one short rate should suffice
to represent the spectrum. Take long-term rates first.Macaulay's
work34 indicates that long-term rates around 1900 were at the lowest
levels ever recorded before the late 1930's;yet the usable reserve
ratio was then reaching new all-time lows, not the highs to be expected
from an inverse relation between the two variables.It is true that
long-term rates turned up moderately in 1899 on the first leg of a
twenty-year rise, and it might be argued that the reduction of usable
reserves beginning in 1897—98 anticipated that improvement in bond
earnings. By buying when rates were low (and bond prices high),
however, banks would suffer capital losses as rates rose.If they had
anticipated the rise in rates, they would not have committed all their
usable funds at the lowest rates, as in fact they largely did, though
mostly in loans rather than bonds. Indeed, whether banks wanted a
high yield or large capital gains, their funds should have been heavily
invested in the late 1860's and early 1870's before the secular decline
started and when rates were still high. Yet we saw that the usable
reserve ratio was highest at that time. The yields on bonds with long
maturities clearly do not explain the downward trend in the reserve
ratio. No obvious transformation of those yields in an attempt to
approximate banks' expectations of future movements in interest rates
would alter this conclusion.
A long-run relation between the usable reserve ratio and interest
F. R. rvlacaulay, SomeTheoretical ProblemsSuggested by theMovementsof Interest
Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices intheUnited States since 1856, New York, NBER, 1938.210 THE RESERVE RA TIO
rates fares no better with short-term rates.True, those rates were
rising after about 1897, when the usable ratio was falling;but they
had been higher in earlier years, when the ratio was high, and touched
levels at least as low in later years, when the ratio remained low.
This evidence does not rule out some effect of interest rates on bank
reserves, particularly for short-run cycles or for extreme movements
like the 1930's, discussed further later, but it seems clear that any such
effect is of secondary importance at best for secular movements and
certainly cannot explain the downward trend in the reserve ratio.
Since interest rates are no help, we may look to developments in the
economic and institutional environment to explain the downward
trend in the ratio. Such developments are hard to quantify, and we
must rely largely on qualitative evidence.
Establishment of the Federal Reserz.'e System. One possibility is that the
stability of the monetary system tended to improve over time. The
most publicized contribution to that development was passage of
the Federal Reserve Act. Previously, the banking system had to handle
emergencies itself.After 1914, banks could look to Federal Reserve
Banks to supply unforeseen demands for currency and could put all
but required and working balances into earning assets. The creation of
the Federal Reserve System probably accounted for part of the small
but gradual reduction in the usable reserve ratio during the prosperous
first decade and a half of its operation.In addition, member banks
satisfy reserve requirements by their average holdings over a week or
two, whereas national banks before 1914 had to meet requirements on
a day-to-day basis. The founders of the System did not foresee these
expansionary effects on the money supply.35
Although banks raised the usable reserve ratio in the 1930's to
levels not seen in over fifty years, it does not seem necessary to treat
the 1930's as a special chapter in banking history to be explained by
economic stagnation and an unusual decline in the demand for loans.
Confidence in the Federal Reserve System built up during the 1920's
must have been shattered in 1933 when the System failed to prevent
a disastrous deflation of bank credit and the highest rate of suspensions
among federally supervised banks in history. In that year the number
of suspended member banks was a catastrophic 18.7 per cent of all
35See Seymour Harris, Twenty Years of Federal Reserve Policy, Harvard University
Press, 1933, \Tol. 1, p. 261.THE RESERVE RATIO 211
member banks operating at the first of the year. In the preceding three
years suspensions had been much higher than normal but nothing
like the contagion of bankruptcies in 1933.36Theusable reserve ratio
in the 1929—33 contraction did not rise to unusually high levels, and
from 1933 to 1936 it went no higher than after panics or in depressions
before 1914—1875—78, 1884—85, and 1894 (see Chart 20).Indeed,
because usable reserves were so low in the early l930's, partly in
response to the supposed security provided by Federal Reserve Banks,
member banks were hard hit by the 1933 panic. This, we may con-
jecture, goes a long way toward explaining why it wrought such havoc
within the banking system when, by comparison, recuperation from
previous panics had been remarkably fast. In the historical perspective
of Chart 20, the large ascent of usable reserves from 1929 to 1935
does not seem extraordinary for such a period.37Part might also
reflect a delayed adjustment to large gold inflows, though that would
explain a temporarily higher level of the ratio, not a continued rise.
After 1938, the usable reserve ratio reached unprecedented levels
perhaps attributable in some degree to the extreme duration of de-
pressed business conditions and extremely low interest rates, especially
on short-term securities.
Since World War II, banks have apparently regained confidence in
the Federal Reserve's ability and willingness to lend ample funds in a
crisis. The large influx of gold during the 1930's and 1940's provided
the Reserve Banks with a new margin of excess lending power over
their statutory reserve requirements, which, in addition, were reduced
in 1945. Hence, their ability to avert a liquidity crisis was not ques-
tioned in the prosperous climate of the 1945—55 decade.
The percentage rate for 1930 was 2.3;1931, 6.4; and 1932, 4.6. The highest
previous rate for member banks was 1.7 per Cent in 1926; the highest corresponding
percentage for national banks prior to the Federal Reserve System was 1.8 in 1893.
The highest rate for all commercial banks before the 1930's was 5.8 per cent in 1893
(see Banking and Monetary Statistics, p. 283;Historical Statistics, 1949, series N135;
and Banking Studies, p. 418). Suspensions are closing of banks by civil authorities, other
than during special holidays, and include suspensions subsequently lifted after re-
organization or mergers. The 1933 figure does not include banks closed after the
banking holiday but licensed to reopen by June 30 of that year, following the nation-
wide bank examinations during the holiday. There was, of course, a higher than usual
rate of bank failures during the 1920's, but that reflected the agricultural distress and
not lack of liquidity in the banking system as a whole like that during the early
1930's.
\%.'arburton (Turning Points) lists many possible reasons for the high level of the
ratio in addition to the panic itself.212 THE RESERVE RATIO
Federal Deposit Insurance. Deposit insurance has probably been a more
important factor accounting for the low levels of the usable reserve
ratio since the mid-1940's.Instituted in 1934, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation grew rapidly and soon insured nearly all
commercial bank deposits up to a specified amount. The insurance
strikes at the root of banking panics—fear of loss through suspension
of payments—and thereby removes the main reason for holding large
usable reserves.Since participating banks pay the estimated cost,
its principal value is not so much as insurance to spread the risk of loss
as a remedy to reduce the risk;its very existence reduces the incidence
of losses by removing the likelihood of runs on banks. With wide partici-
pation in the FDIC achieved by the mid-1940's, banks returned the
usable reserve ratio to low levels.In the prosperous year 1955, for
example, this ratio for all member banks hovered around 1 per cent,
barely enough to fill day-to-day needs for working balances.
The exact timing of the decline in the usable ratio in the early
1940's from the high levels of the late 1930's can be attributed to an
improved business outlook and also to a change in government policy.
In 1942, the Federal Reserve Banks promised to keep U.S. bonds at
fixed prices, and banks soon converted their huge usable reserves into
those near-moneys that paid interest.The purchases were made
despite the historically low rate paid, which suggests that fear of capital
losses—_allayed now by the support program—was an important
factor holding back such investments by banks in the late 1930's. The
price-support program ended in 1951, and the low usable reserve
ratio since then must be attributed to factors previously discussed and to
the active market for federal funds, which developed during the 1950's.
Establishment of the National Banking System. Since creation of the
Federal Reserve System and later of federal deposit insurance can
explain the decline and continued low levels of the usable reserve
ratio in most of the period since 1914, what explains its much more
pronounced decline before that? The answer seems the same: im-
provement in the stability of the monetary system, even without the
dramatic remedies instituted since 1914. There is no question that
the national banking system set up in 1863 appreciably toned down
monetary disturbances. The operation of national banks was a model
of prudence compared with pre-Civil War banking practices and, al-
though periodic panics still occurred, they did not match the financial
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clearing house loan certificates during panics, which helped alleviate
the extreme distress of currency shortages. We may conjecture that
banks gradually decided that usable ratios could safely be reduced
in view of the improved financial climate.
Treasury Operations. A clue to an important factor in that decision is
the timing of the largest noncyclical reduction in the 1897—1902
period.At that time, the Treasury began to use its cash holdings
regularly for easing stringencies in the money market. The Treasury
increased its deposits at national banks in the last quarter of each year
to offset the seasonal drain of currency from bank reserves and, in
business downturns, to offset the cyclical drain.It will be recalled
(Chapter 4) that the currency-money ratio often rose moderately in
reference stages IV through VII and by large amounts in panics,
though the reference cycle patterns did not reveal the full amount of
the rise. Those periodic pressures on bank reserves necessitated ample
cash reserves.Before the late 1890's, as Chart 20 shows, banks kept
large usable reserves, presumably for that reason. Afterward, 1897—
1902, when Treasury intervention in the market in times of stress
could be relied upon, banks were quick to find alternative uses for
their large usable reserves.
That the Treasury might assume the functions of a central bank
and alleviate monetary conditions had been recognized much earlier,
but various difficulties stood in the way.38 The main difficulty centered
around the restrictions imposed by the Independent Treasury Act
(1846), a relic of the pre-Civil \Var banking era which Congress could
not be persuaded to repeal for a long time afterward. As originally
passed, the act forbade the Treasury to make or receive payments with
bank checks and notes or to hold its own funds on deposit at banks.
Regional subtreasuries were set up to make and receive all payments
in gold (or, as amended in 1862, in greenbacks, except government
interest payments and customs duties).Since Treasury receipts and
disbursements did not exactly coincide, the arrangement produced
variations in high-powered money outstanding which upset the money
market. To avoid a continual transfer of high-powered money to
Treasury coffers throughout the 1880's, when the government budget
was running a surplus, the Treasury had to retire its outstanding
interest-bearing debt (mentioned in Chapter 3). To avoid variations
This paragraph draws upon Margaret G. Myers, The New York Money Market,
New York, 1931, Vol. I, Chap. XVII.214 THE RESERVE RATIO
in high-powered money outside the Treasury in the short run, owing
to discrepancies between receipts for tax revenues and disburse-
ments for budget expenditures or bond purchases, the Treasury
might have wanted to buy and sell short-term certificates of indebted-
ness or to deposit its cash holdings at banks. But the Treasury had no
short-term debt outstanding or authority to purchase private debt,
and the deposit of funds at banks was restricted by the Independent
Treasury Act (as later amended) to revenues other than customs at
the time of their collection; funds deposited in the Treasury could
not be transferred to banks.In consequence, while the maximum
level of the Treasury's cash holdings was kept down during the 1880's
by bond purchases, it fluctuated erratically in the short run and
generally to the detriment of monetary stability, as we shall see shortly.
Treasury officials were so hard pressed just to hold down the govern-
ment's cash surplus that they made various "interpretations" of the
Independent Treasury Act and breached the restrictions on funds to
be deposited at banks. The act's definition of proper collateral was
successively relaxed, and various excuses for holding certain specified
funds at banks were found. Congress finally authorized those actions
after they had become precedents.By the early 1890's, however,
when the Treasury had succeeded to some degree in learning how to
live with the act, the budget condition turned from surplus to deficit,
and for five years the Treasury concerned itself with little else than
preserving its solvency. Until 1896, it repeatedly had to borrow and
was in no position to come to the aid of the banks as a disburser of
money in stringencies.
This brief review of the period helps to explain why the Treasury
suddenly assumed the functions of a central bank in the late 1890's.
After1895,business improved, the government's finances again
showed a surplus, and Secretaries of the Treasury turned their interest
to wider horizons. A remarkable series of controversial pronounce-
ments—for that era—emanated from that normally sedate post.It
was proclaimed that the stability of the money market was the proper
interest of the Treasury, and even that it had the power and obligation
to eradicate monetary crises from the western world.39 While the
Irefer to Secretary Shaw's famous 1906 report (see Treasury Report, 1906, p. 49);
see also Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, Chap. 4, sect. 1; and R. H.
Timberlake, "Mr. Shaw and his Critics: Monetary Policy in the Golden Era Re-
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Treasury may have been ready and willing to adapt its cash holdings
to the needs of the market, how "able" was it?
In his study of seasonal movements in Treasury funds deposited at
national banks, Kemmerer4° found a marked contrast between the
period before and after 1897. Before then, those deposits were usually
low in the last three months of the year relative to the beginning
months; the main exception was a slight increase in 1893, apparently
because of Treasury bond sales.Otherwise, the Treasury tended to
depress bank reserves in the autumn when they most needed bolstering.
To check Kemmerer's results, which are based on absolute amounts,
I computed the ratio of U.S. to individual deposits at national banks.
It was usually around 1 per cent from 1880 to 1896 and, while more
often lower than higher in the last months of the year, changes over
the year were relatively unimportant.In comparison, the period
from 1897 to 1908 wasjust the reverse: in seven of the eleven years, the
ratio was higher in the last quarter of the year. (Kemmerer also had
found that U.S. deposits in the last three months at that time were
generally higher than those in the first nine months.) The amount
of change in the ratio over the year was also considerably higher than
it was before 1897. From 1909 to 1914 it renewed its earlier erratic
behavior, though its variations again became fairly small. Notwith-
standing that lapse, the year 1897 marked a clear change in the seasonal
movement of U.S. deposits at banks, small and irregular before that
year and, thereafter, larger and usually upward during each calendar
year.
As for the importance of Treasury policy to the long-run level of the
reserve ratio, perhaps a better indication than seasonal movements is
cyclical movements in U.S. deposits. Banks might have been able to
eliminate part of the seasonal increase in their usable reserve ratios
during the spring and summer months because of stabilizing variations
in U.S. deposits, but they would still have needed sizable reserves
during cyclical expansions to prepare for the stringencies which often
develop midway through cyclical contractions. Only if the Treasury
supplied funds in contractions and withdrew them in expansions might
banks dispense with much of their usable reserves. The correspondence
40EdwinW. Kemmerer, Seasonal Variations in the Relative Demand for Money and
capital in the United States (61st Cong., 2d Sess., S. Doc. 588), National Monetary
Commission, 1910, p. 159. Treasury deposits were not placed at nonnational banks
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of Treasury actions to such a policy is shown in Table 26. In the late
1890's, cyclical movements in U.S. deposits began systematically to
alleviate the normal pattern of stringencies by providing more funds
in contractions than in expansions.
As column 3 demonstrates, by comparing the level during contrac-
tions with the average level during the preceding and succeeding expan-
sions, the contribution of U.S. deposits to monetary stability changed
TABLE26













Mar. 1882—Mar. 1887 1.0 1.1 0.0
Mar. 1887—July1890 2.7 2.9 0.7
July 1890—Jan. 1893 1.6 0.8 —0.3
Jan. 1893—Dec. 1895 0.6 0.8 —0.2
Dec. 1895—June1899 0.9 2.3 —0.7
June 1899—Seot.1902 3.6 3.5 0.7
Sept.1902—May1907 4.4 2.4 1.4
May1907—Jan. 1910 4.5 1.6 2.5
Jan. 1910—Jan. 1913 0.7 0.7 —0.4
Jan. 1913—Aug. 1918 1.0
Note:Ratios shown are unweighted averages of ratios for call dates
falling within reference expansions and Contractions (Annual Report of
theComptroller ofthe Currency).
aExciudesfirsttwo calldates ofthe expansion phase for which the
ratio wasabnormallyhigh, because of Treasury refunding operations.
dramatically in the late 1890's. That behavior shows up in. Chart 6
in a rise from reference expansions to contractions in the nongold source
of changes in high-powered money, greater from 1897 to 1908 than the
corresponding rise in the contribution of the gold stock; that is, the ratio
of high-powered money to the gold stock rose.4' (We may also note that
Treasury operations shown in Chart 6 were considerably less erratic
after 1897 than before.) The actual contribution of Treasury operations
to banks' usable reserves was even greater than it was to high-powered
The nongold source also rose during the contractionary phase of the 1894—97
reference cycle, but the significance of the rise is obscured by the upsurge in gold
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money, because the funds were deposited directly in banks. When such
funds are used to buy bonds from the public, instead (as in open market
operations of Federal Reserve Banks), the operation also increases the
public's cash balances, but only part of the increase is deposited at banks
and is subject to reserve requirements. The currency-money ratio in-
dicates the fraction eventually held as currency. When the Treasury
deposits funds directly in banks, the whole supplements usable reserves
except what is deducted for required reserves.After October 1902,
when reserves behind U.S. deposits were no longer required, all
deposits supplemented usable reserves.42
The percentages in Table 26 are approximately equal to the changes
in the total reserve ratio produced by Treasury operations.The
changes of 1 to 3 percentage points may not seem very important, but
their effect may have been greater than these figures indicate, for
two reasons.First, most of the changes applied only to New York
City banks, which held about one-fifth of individual deposits in all
national banks. Hence the effect on the reserve ratio of New York
City banks could have been as much as 5 times greater than the amount
shown. Table 25 shows that most of the long-run decline in the level
of the usable reserve ratio of central reserve city national banks occurred
simultaneously with that change in Treasury policy.Second, the
change in policy superseded former actions that were a source of
cyclical instability in bank reserves. Column 3 of Table 26 shows that
the Treasury reduced the reserve ratio by 0.7 percentage points in the
contraction following the 1895 peak and increased it by 2.5 points in
the contraction a decade later following the 1907 peak. The difference
of over 3 points provides a crude measure of the net gain to usable
reserve ratios, though the gain was less in other contractions. National
banks actually reduced their usable reserve ratios almost 4 points, on
the average, from the late 1890's to 1907. While the pattern of U.S.
deposits in the 19 10—13 period was moderately procyclical, financial
conditions never degenerated to the point where banks needed much
42Around1900, the required reserve ratio for all national banks was roughly
15 per cent and the currency ratio roughly 17 per cent. A dollar of high-powered
money added to the public's cash balances therefore increased usable reserves by
—0.17)$(l —0.15),or $0.71. A dollar deposited directly in national banks by
the Treasury increased usable reserves by $(1 —0.15),which exceeds the increase
of the other method by [(1 —0.15)J(l—0.l7)(1—0.15)]—1,or2O per cent. After
reserve requirements against U.S. deposits were removed in 1902, the second method
exceeded the other by [l/(1 —0.17)(1—0.15)]—I,or 41 per cent.218 THE RESER VE RA TIO
outside help, and there was no reason to believe the Treasury did not
remain ready to provide substantial help if needed. We may conclude,
therefore, that the Treasury's new policy after 1897 contributed
reserves up to about three-fourths of the subsequent reduction in the
usable reserve ratio. The actual contribution may have been larger
or smaller, depending on the confidence of banks in the Treasury's
ability and willingness to pursue its self-appointed role as central
banker. The related timing of the events just rehearsed suggests that
confidence was strong or, at any rate, strong enough to sweep away
the prior reluctance of banks to sacrifice the safety of large usable
reserves for increased earnings from their investment. From the banks'
point of view, the Federal Reserve Act confirmed a policy the Treasury
had already inaugurated more than a decade before.
Although the change in Treasury policy probably explains most of
the long-run decline in the reserve ratio after 1897, it seems unlikely
to explain much of the decline in the national bank reserve ratio from
1887 to 1890 (Table 25). The improvement in the Treasury's handling
of its funds in the eighties was short lived (Table 26); yet the reserve
ratio for all national banks declined (except in the difficult 1892—95
period).43It is not possible, therefore, to attribute the early decline to
Treasury actions.That decline can be attributed to the over-all
improvement in the stability of the monetary system.
It might be argued that the long-run decline in the usable reserve
ratio after 1897 coincided with increases in the rate of growth of high-
powered money, not accounted for by Treasury operations, and that
the prospect of rising future reserves led banks to reduce present
usable reserves. They might also have relied on the continued ex-
pansion of the credit base to take care of possible temporary strin-
gencies. The year 1897 marked the end of the protracted deflation
which had gripped the country since the end of the Civil War. Huge
gold inflows in 1896 and subsequent years heralded a major reversal
of trend, as we saw in Chapter 3. From the depression years of 1893—97,
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, however, did attribute most of the early
decline to Treasury operations.In 1890 it deplored the following alleged practice:
"The time was when our banks provided beforehand for the fall trade, and so trimmed
their sails, if we may be permitted to use the expression, through the summer months
as to avert a storm, by preparing themselves for the crop demand. Of late years they
have looked to the Treasury wholly, and have gone through the summer trenching
on their reserves regardless of any increased drain sure to come later."(Dec. 6,
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money and prices started to rise sharply, and a wave of prosperity
spread across the country in vivid contrast to the preceding years.
That turn in the business and financial outlook surely made a big
difference to banks and might have led them to work down their
usable reserves.It allowed the Treasury to engage in long-desired
operations, previously impossible.
The latter part of the 1890's is an example of those decisive—and,
for the historian, exasperating—periods when so many things happened
all at once. Yet other relationships that might be proposed to explain
the decline in the reserve ratio then do not hold consistently at other
times. There is little relation over the long run between changes in the
usable reserve ratio and the rate of growth of high-powered money;
the ratio fell a few times when the rate rose but in general did not
rise when the rate fell. Other financial developments due to improved
business conditions after 1897 might have affected the speed with
which banks adjusted the level of the reserve ratio, but much less the
long-run desired level.
In conclusion: The explanation for the downward trend in the
usable reserve ratio which seems most consistent with the data, there-
fore, is the greater stability of the monetary system produced during
and after the Civil War by increased state and federal regulation of
banking, after 1897 by the assumption of central banking functions by
the Treasury, after 1914 by the Federal Reserve Banks, and after 1934
by federal deposit insurance.
4. Cyclical .Ivlovements
In addition to a secular decline, the reserve ratio displays short-run
cyclical fluctuations, not explained by shifts in deposits and changes
in reserve requirements. Since the total ratio is affected by changes in
requirements and shifts in deposits, over which individual banks have
no control, the usable reserve ratio would be preferable for cyclical
analysis, but a series on usable reserves is not available for all com-
mercial banks.The preceding examination of changes in reserve
requirements helps us to allow for their major effects. The reference
cycle patterns of the total reserve ratio, plotted in Chart 21, show the
level of the series, not its contribution to the rate of change in the money
stock as in Chart 2.CHART 21
Reference Cycle Patterns of the Reserve Ratio of All Commercial Banks,
Source: Same as for Chart 2and TableF-i.
Note: For annual data before 1908, stages II, IV, VI, and VIII are omitted, and
some of the standings for stages III and VII are based on interpolations.
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The reference cycle patterns show a high inverse conformity of the
reserve ratio to business cycles. The ratio generally declined during
business expansions (stages Ito V) and either leveled off or rose during
business contractions (stages V to IX). The major turning or in-
flection point in the patterns usually coincided with the peaks and
troughs of reference cycles. That the amount of decline during ex-
pansions usually exceeded the amount of rise during contractions
reflects the downward trend of the ratio.
The chart shows movements during similar stages of different
cycles. Because the actual time covered by the different cycles varies,
the impact on the economy of a given change in the reserve ratio,
and thereby in the money stock, depends on how fast the change
occurs.It is appropriate to look also at changes in the ratio per
time period. The average change per month in the relative reference
cycle standing of the ratio during reference expansions and con-
tractions is presented in Table 27. The average change per month
for contractions minus that for the preceding expansion, shown in the
last column, is uniformly positive except for the two post-World War
II cycles—that is, the rate of change in the ratio generally rises more
or falls less in contractions than in the preceding expansions. This
supports the visual impression from Chart 21 that movements in the
ratio conform closely to reference cycles.Moreover, the two cases
of nonconformity can be attributed to the effects of changes in reserve
requirements. Member bank requirements were raised during the
expansionary phases of the 1945—49 and 1949—54 cycles and lowered
during the contractionary phases (Table 21). These changes in re-
quirements largely account for the concurrent variations in the total
ratio. The usable ratio for member banks shows little change from
stage I to stage V and from V to IX in these cycles (Chart 20). The
other major changes in member bank requirements either worked
to enhance the inverse conformity of the patterns to reference cycles
or to reduce but not eliminate it.If adjusted for changes in reserve
requirements, therefore, the reserve ratio would uniformly display
inverse conformity to business cycles.
Although conforming closely to cycles, the short-run fluctuations
have varied greatly in amplitude. The large increases during reference
contractions appeal' to be associated with financial disturbances and
deep depressions.To confirm such an association, averages of theTABLE 27
IN ThE RESERVE RATIO DURING REFERENCE CYCLES, 1879_195L+
Difference Between
Average Change per

















Mar.'79 Mar.'82 May '85 ps —0.67 0.61 1.28
May '85 Mar.'87 Apr.'88 —0.75 0.18 0.93
Apr.'88 July'90 May p —0.73 0.46 1.19
May '91 Jan.'93 June'94 PS —0.02 1.40 1.42
June'94 Dec.'95 June'97 —1.17 0.39 1.56
June'97 June'99 Dec.'00 —0.82 —0.22 0.60
Dec.'00 Sept.'O2Aug.'04 —0.49 0.14 0.63
Aug.'04 May '07 June'08 ps —0.48 2.03 2.51
MONTHLY DATf'.
June'08 Jan.'10 Jan.'12 —0.71 —0.03 0.68
Jan.'12 Jan.'13 Dec.'14 p —0.71 —0.10 0.61
Dec.'14 Aug.'13 Apr.'19 —0.21 —0.15 0.06
Apr.'19 Jan.'20 Sept.'21 s —h07 —0.24 0.83
'23 July'24 —0.26 0.24 0.50
July'24 Oct.'26 Dec.'27 —0.30 0.01 0.31
Dec.'27 June'29 —0.25 107 1.32
Mar.'33 May '37 May '38 s 0.98 1.40 0.42
May '38 Feb.'45 Oct.'45 —0.36 —0.02 0.34
Oct.'45 Nov.'48 Oct.'49 0.37 —1.71 —2.08
Oct.'49 July'53 Aug.'54 0.05 —0.60 —0.65
Averages
6 panic cycles 0.91 1.39
6 severe cycles 1.04 1.30
11 nonpanic and nonsevere cycles —0.16 0.26
9 nonpanic and nonsevere cycles,
excluding 1945-54 cycles 0.05 0.62
Note:The ratio here is tile ratio of high—powered reserves to deposits
of the public at all commercial banks, as in Chart 21.
asome slight revisions in these dates, made since this table was computed,
would not change the figures significantly.
panic cycles, so designated because payments were suspended or
Clearing House loan certificates were issued by New York City banks, as in
Table 14.
s =sixmost severe nonwar contractions, as judged by the percentage de-
cline in aggregate output (see Table 1).
While there is no sharp dividing line between severe and moderate contrac-
tions, slight changes in the designations do not greatly affect the averages
at the bottom of the table.For example, if the severest of the moderate
contractions from 1879 to 1954, that of 1895—97, is shifted to the severe—
cycle group, the three affected averages for cols. 2 and 3 are:
Averages (2) (3)
7 most severe cycles 0.95 1.33
10 nonpariic and nonsevere cycles —0.22 0.13
8 nonpanic and nonsevere cycles,
excluding 1945—54 cycles 0.22 0.51
The war cycles are not separated here unlike the analysis of high—
powered money and the currency ratio, where there is strong reason to
exclude them as atynical.
CSemiannual data 1879—81; monthly data beginning May 1907.THE RESERVE RATIO 223
measures in columns 2 and 3 of Table 27 are shown for three groups:
six most severe cycles, as judged by the percentage decline during
reference contractions in aggregate output;panic cycles in which
payments were suspended or New York City banks resorted to Clearing
House loan certificates to ease a currency shortage; and all other
cycles.
The averages for panic and severe cycles are much higher than the
average for all other cycles,44 even when we exclude from the mild
cycles the two post-World War II contractions, in which the usual
pattern was reversed by the effects of changes in reserve requirements.
The ratio appears to react sharply to financial panics and severe
contractions.Whether both are of equal importance cannot be
readily judged from these figures, since the averages for the two groups
contain practically the same cycles.
We may assess their separate effects by looking at cycles in which
only one occurred. There are four:1888—91 and 1912—14, which had
panics but were not severe; and 1919—21 and 1933—38, which were
severe but did not have panics.Unfortunately, two of these cycles,
1912—14 and 1933—38, provide little evidence on the separate effects
of panics and severe contractions and must be discarded. The panic
of 1914, as noted in Chapter 4, was a rather mild affair, thanks to the
ability of national banks to make emergency issues of national bank
notes undei' the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908. Before that, issue of
scrip currency was really illegal, and clearing houses undoubtedly
resorted to its issue at a later point in panics and in smaller quantities
than desirable. When the outbreak of war in 1914 touched off a
financial panic, the special notes were issued quickly and freely.
(The Federal Reserve Banks were not yet organized and so could not
make loans.) With that new source of currency on hand, it was to be
expected that banks would face the panic with unaccustomed calm-
ness.As evident in the reference cycle pattern of the reserve ratio
for the cycle ending in 1914, banks did not contract appreciably, a
suspension of payments did not occur, and the panic subsided quickly.
The cycle never developed the repercussions that would be expected
from large unsatisfied increases in the demand fbr currency.It offers
"Amplitude measures like those in Table 27 are smaller for annual than for monthly
data. The table therefore tends to understate the average for the panic cycles more
than for the other groups, since four of the six panic cycles occurred before 1908 and
are measured with annual data.224 THE RESERVE RA TIO
no proof, therefore, that ordinary panics do not affect the ratio.
During the 1933—38 cycle the ratio was affected by changes in require-
ments. The behavior of other financial institutions, discussed earlier,
suggests that the reserve ratio for commercial banks would have
remained more or less constant had requirements not increased, and
therefore that the severity of the business decline itself had no effect. Be
that as it may, that cycle cannot be cited as reliable evidence for the
importance of severe contractions.
When those two cycles are omitted, there remain only two, 1888—9 1
and 1919—21, to show the separate effects of panics and severe con-
tractions on the reserve ratio. They will have to serve as the basis
for a tentative hypothesis. They indicate that panics produce a sharp
rise in the reserve ratio but severe contractions in business do not.
In the 1890—91 contraction, not severe but with a panic, there was a
sizable rate of rise in the ratio. According to column 2 of Table 27,
the rate of rise was larger than in any of the mild cycles and was
exceeded only by rises in the other panic cycles except 1912—14 and
1937—38, which should be omitted.In the 1920—21 contraction—
severe but without a panic—the ratio actually declined, though at a
slightly slower rate than in the preceding expansion, a pattern char-
acteristic of its behavior in mild contractions. The measure of over-all
cyclical variation in column 3 for that cycle is only a little above the
average for the mild cycles. The clear implication is that panics have
an important effect on the ratio and that severe business contractions,
per Se, do not.
Why panics are important is not hard to understand. Such a dis-
turbance threatens the solvency of banks, and they respond by cur-
tailing operations sharply. Every effort is made to bolster cash reserves,
not only to meet heavy withdrawals but also to attain sufficient
liquidity to allay depositors' suspicions of financial weakness. The
banking system can honor only a small fraction of its demand liabilities
at one time, and the more deposits it is asked to redeem, the weaker
its position becomes. The first rule of banking practice is to instill
confidence and avoid a thorough test of the basis for that confidence.
Great efforts to obtain ample cash reserves are therefore to be expected
when financial markets become disturbed.
Appraised by hindsight, those efforts do not produce substantial
results until the panic is over and large reserves are no longer needed.THE RESER VE RA TIO 225
Panics are a harrowing experience which apparently leave a residue
of caution for some time even with bankers who survive it. The post-
panic increases in the reserve ratio may have gone higher, however,
than most banks desired, owing to a heavy inflow of currency (and
in the earlier period, gold from abroad) just when the demand for
loans became quite low.
There are two reasons why a severe contraction alone might be
expected to produce a sizable rise in the reserve ratio: A sharp down-
turn in economic activity, while it does not of itself threaten the sol-
vency of banks, does produce a sharp fall in the demand for loans and so
in the rate of interest. Banks might also hesitate to commit a large
fraction of their portfolios to bonds at 'ow rates of return and might
prefer to hold some of their funds idle.The evidence as a whole
suggests that effects of these factors on the reserve ratio are far less
important than effects of panics are.
If the foregoing interpretation is correct, it is to be expected that a
panic would usually be followed by a severe contraction.Financial
panics cause large increases in the reserve and currency ratios. The
result is a substantial reduction in the money stock unless the increases
are offset by increases in high-powered money. As the analysis of
Chapter 2 shows, such changes in high-powered money have usually
not occurred. Panics produce a sharp contraction in the money stock,
therefore, and this wrenches the credit structure of the whole economy
and disrupts commerce. The two nonsevere panic cycles, 1888—91
and 19 12—14, did not have such effects on the money stock and so are
not exceptions to the importance of those effects. In the 1890—91 con-
traction the increase in the reserve ratio was not accompanied by a
sharp rise in the currency ratio (the panic was largely confined to
New York City, and a general suspension of payments did not occur)
and was partly offset by increases in high-powered money. The 1914
panic did not initiate the customary rise in the reserve ratio. All other
panics since 1873 have been accompanied by severe business de-
pressions. Of these, only the 1884 crisis did not involve a suspension
of payments, but the rise in the reserve ratio was nonetheless still
appreciable. The paucity of evidence—few severe contractions and
panics not occurring together—indirectly supports the foregoing
interpretation.
The argument cannot be turned around to plead the importance226 THE RESERVE RATIO
of severe contractions as a cause of panics and hence of the reduction
in the money stock, because the panics were not caused by a low level
of business activity.This much can be said even though we cannot
specify the actual causes.Panics are a strange phenomenon, not
readily explained in any satisfactory way except by reciting the
particular series of events setting off each one. They are often described
as chain reactions going from worsening expectations to mass hysteria.
But there is nothing irrational about the behavior of each individual in
a panic;if a bank is subject to a run, there is no point in being the
last person in line.The difficulty is in specifying the precise con-
ditions in which a run starts and keeps going.Certain contributory
factors can be identified.Panics were more frequent before 1914
owing to the pre-Worid War I banking system with its inverted
pyramid of credit resting on New York City banks and absence of
emergency reserves provided by a central bank—though the worst
panic came under the Federal Reserve System. Panics have usually
developed in the early stages of cyclical downturns (1933 is the most
dramatic exception), when the usable reserve ratio was comparatively
low. No doubt the accompanying downturn in business activity set
the stage but was not alone the cause. Banks were typically vulnerable
to a rise in the currency ratio or a gold outflow at such times, yet only
because of some series of shocks to confidence did the public panic.
Banks were not much tighter before panics than at many other ref-
erence peaks. In their time sequence, panics have not been spontaneous
but have been sparked by failure of a few large financial companies,
often involving fraud or mismanagement frequently brought to light
but hardly caused by the business downturn. In any event, it is impos-
sible to associate most panics with the severity of a business contraction
since they typically arose early in the downturn.
There is no reason a severe contraction could not occur without a
large increase in the reserve ratio and so without a panic.Large
increases in the reserve and currency ratios, which are characteristic
of panics, are not always responsible for the relation (Table 1) between
the amplitude of decline in the rate of change of the money stock and
the amplitude of the subsequent decline in economic activity. A large
decline in the growth of high-powered money could account and
sometimes has accounted for the relation. To be sure, a sufficiently
drastic decline might endanger the liquidity of the banking systemTHE RESERVE RATIO 227
and so precipitate a panic. This could explain why so many more
panics occurred before 1914 than after:before 1914, sharp outflows
of gold sometimes forced banks to contract credit too fast; after 1914,
Federal Reserve Banks could offset such outflows, at least temporarily,
by an expansion of their credit. A decline in the growth of high-
powered money need not have this effect, however, and the 1921
contraction is a notable example. Federal Reserve Banks contracted
credit in 1921 to liquidate their "overextended" position following
the wartime expansion. The reduction did not proceed faster than
member banks were able to contract loans, and the solvency of the
banking system was not endangered. Such a large reduction in high-
powered money, though it has rarely occurred without producing a
liquidity crisis, nevertheless suggests that a panic, not the resulting
collapse of economic activity, leads banks to scramble for cash.
The reference contractions containing the panics of 1884 and 1933
might seem to support the importance of severe business declines for
large increases in the reserve ratio, since those panics came late in the
contractions. Yet, these contractions support the opposite conclusion,
if anything. Chart 21 shows that the steep rise in the reserve ratio
during the two cycles came, not immediately after the reference peak,
but later.In the 1882—85 contraction the ratio rose most rapidly in
the second half and, so far as the annual data show, after the panic.
In the 1929—33 contraction it rose most rapidly in stages VIII and IX,
after the breakdown of the banking system had started, though the
panic did not come until stage IX. That disaster was imminent for
some time before the authorities declared a banking holiday, as in-
dicated by the rise in the currency ratio and the high incidence of
bank failures before the suspension of payments in March 1933.
En summary: A financial panic reflects a deterioration of public
confidence in banks, owing principally perhaps to their precarious
reserve position.It is caused by a variety of factors, of which a severe
decline in economic activity by no means appears to be the only or even
an important one. A panic impairs the solvency of banks, which
contract credit drastically in an effort to raise the reserve ratio. The
contraction of credit in turn has deflationary effects on the economy
which aggravate the decline in output. Panics have not precipitated
cyclical downturns;all of them cited here have followed peaks in
economic activity. Many panics have also come during the first half228 THE RESERVE RATIO
of contractions, too early to be the result solely of a severe decline in
economic activity, and so were, to a large extent, independent factors
aggravating the decline.
Apart from panic cycles, fluctuations in the reserve ratio conform
also to mild reference cycles, though the amplitude of fluctuation in
such cycles is fairly small. The ratio rose slightly or had a lower rate
of decline in all mild reference contractions except those in which new
reserve requirements were imposed. Chart 21 shows that the rate of
decline in the ratio usually falls midway through reference expansions
as well. Consequently, in mild cycles the ratio plays a role in form-
ing the specific cycle peak in the rateof change of the money stock
(Chart 2), which precedes the peak in business activity. That the decline
in the reserve ratio during reference expansions is arrested well before
the peak in business activity suggests that banks try to prevent the
usable reserve ratio from falling below some minimum level, although
the minimum is subject to secular changes. The existence of such a
minimum would explain why the fall of the ratio is not continuous
throughout reference expansions but stops before the peak, even
though business prospects remain bright. What is not clear, however,
is why the usable reserve ratio rises above the minimum during business
recessions.
One might expect the rise to reflect a decline in interest rates.
If a panic occurs in the early stages of a recession, of course, interest
rates first rise sharply. As the recession deepens, however, a decline
in the demand for capital tends to outweigh public preferences for
liquidity, and rates on borrowed funds fall.The fall, making cash
reserves more attractive to banks, might explain the rise or reduced
rate of decline in the reserve ratio during contractions. The a priori
plausibility of such a relationship tells us nothing about its actual
importance, however.
Secular movements in the ratio are inconsistent with that relation-
ship (Section 3).The usable reserve ratio of national or member
banks fluctuated about the same level, or possibly a slightly declining
one, from 1875 to around the turn of the century; bond yields declined
during that period, whereas the postulated relationship requires
inverse movements. Although short-term rates rose after 1896 and
the ratio fell, the rise in rates was no more than the decline during the
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the ratio fluctuated about the same level from 1902 until 1914. After
a moderate rise during World War I, the usable ratio slowly fell during
the l920's to a lower level than ever reached before, while bond yields
were declining.For the whole period from 1875 to 1930, the only
evidence of inverse movements is the short period 1896—l902----for
short-term rates only; otherwise the correlation either is nonexistent
or has the wrong sign. Unlike bond yields, short-term interest rates,
such as commercial paper rates, did not have a clear-cut secular
trend up to 1930 except possibly a sharp fall during the 1870's and
so cannot explain secular movements in the reserve ratio before
1930.
During \'Vorld War II, the usable reserve ratio fell sharply, well
before interest rates reached a long-run trough in 1946. The ratio
then fluctuated about the same level until 1950 and declined only
slightly thereafter, while interest rates registered one of the sharpest
increases on record. The 1950's may be disregarded, however, since
usable reserves were too low to permit a large decline.
Evidence in favor of an inverse relation between interest rates and
the usable reserve ratio may be cited for only the 1930's (though our
earlier interpretation of this period was entirely different) and possibly
for 1896—1902.But there are other factors that can explain those
movements, factors of sufficient importance to make the interest-rate
relationship relatively minor.
Cyclical movements in the ratio may still reflect interest-rate effects
even though secular movements do not. To assess the evidence, let us
look at changes in the ratio over reference expansions and contractions.
The changes shown in Chart 21 for the total ratio of commercial
banks will be adequate for this purpose, though we should allow for
important changes in requirements.Chart 22 plots, as a scatter
diagram, changes over reference expansions and contractions in the
relative standings of the reserve ratio shown in Chart 21 against the
corresponding changes for short-term interest rates. The dated phases
since the 1929 reference peak include all the extreme points on the
diagram.
If the two expansions and two contractions of the 1930's on the
edges of the second and third quadrants are deleted, very little negative
correlation in the remaining points can be detected, though it is im-
proved if we also delete the other three dated points in the post-World230 THE RESERVE RATIO
CHART 22
Scatter Diagram of the Reserve Ratio and Short- Term Interest Rates:Changes in
Reference Cycle Relatives over Expansions and Contractions, 1879—1954
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Source:Reserve ratio, same as for Chart 21 and Table F-i; interest rate, 1879—
1927, commercial paper rates, and, 1927—54, short-term U.S. securities.
Note: Cyclical phases since 1929 are dated.
War II period. The slight negative correlation in the undated points
disappears almost entirely if we treat the expansions and contractions
separately.In other words, the undated points are correlated onlyTHE RESERVE RA TIO 231
because the ratio declined and interest rates rose over reference ex-
pansions and vice versa over contractions.This is hardly evidence
of dependence, since many series have corresponding movements over
reference cycles with no implication that they are directly related to
each other. There would have to be a correlation of changes among
expansions and also among contractions to support an implication of
negative correlation. There is virtually none, except when the 1929—45
phases are included—a special period for which movements in the
ratio can be readily explained without interest rates.In a similar
diagram of the reserve ratio and bond yields (not shown), deleting just
the point for the 1933—37 expansion removes alltrace of corre-
lation.
These findings seem out of step with many studies in recent years
which allege a close relation between cash holdings and interest rates.
Surely bankers would be as sensitive to the costs of holding money as
any one, and so their portfolios should exhibit the alleged relation.
Supporting evidence can indeed be forced out of the period since
1929; a rough negative correlation does exist if we ignore the timing
of movements (a big "if"). As we have seen, the reserve ratio rose
during the 1930's and fell thereafter, whereas interest rates fell dras-
tically during the 1930's and then rose after World War II. Laid out
on a scatter diagram, annual data for those years provide an attractive
negative correlation, but the evidence involves essentially two ob-
servations:one movement from 1929 to 1940, and another in the
reverse directions in the subsequent period to 1955.All our other
evidence suggests that this apparent correlation is fortuitous. The
correlationisabsent from earlierperiods, and theriseinthe
ratio after 1930 can be interpreted as a response to the 1929—33
financial disaster and to the 1936—37 increases in reserve require-
ments.
One might argue, of course, that banks became more sensitive to
interest rates after the l92O's than they had been previously, though
it is hard to see why. The trouble with this argument is the failure
of more recent experience to support it.Interest rates rose sharply in
the 1949—53 reference expansion and fell just as sharply in the 1953—54
contraction, yet the points for these two phases are far out of line
with the others in Chart 22. Although the reserve ratio moved counter
to its usual pattern because of changes in member bank requirements,232 THE RESER YE RA TIO
the usable reserve ratio of member banks (after adjusting to the new
requirements) and the total ratio of other commercial banks responded
hardly at all to those sharp movements in interest rates.
The oniy short-run movement that interest rates might explain is
the 1938—40 rise in the usable reserve ratio. By 1938, as was indicated
earlier, member bank usable reserves had regained their level of 1936
before the 1936—37 increases in requirements. From 1938 to 1940
that ratio, as well as that for other financial institutions presented in
Table 22, rose steadily; short-term interest rates dropped to practically
zero, and long-term rates fell to historically low levels. With business
still depressed, banks and other financial institutions may have con-
sidered cash to be as attractive as any alternative asset even though
they felt no need to bolster their liquidity position further. On the
other hand, banks continued to expand loans and investments, though
less rapidly than gold flowed in from abroad.Such high levels of
usable reserves have no precedent, not even in the immediately pre-
ceding years 1930—37, which do not appear unusual by pre-1900
standards. An effect of exceptionally low short-term rates on the
desired reserve ratio cannot be ruled out, though the effect at higher
levels appears negligible.
An effect even at such low rates is still questionable, however, since
the usable reserve ratio fell rapidly during the early 1940's, while
interest rates, as noted, remained at low levels until after 1946. The
change in the economic climate with the outbreak of war clearly had a
much greater effect on the ratio than the rate of return available on
loans and investments had.
The cost of borrowing money may, of course, affect banks' borrowing
from Federal Reserve Banks. The preceding evidence concerns the
distribution of banks' funds between high-powered reserves and other
assets; nothing is implied about the distribution of funds among these
other assets—which the rates available no doubt influence—or about
changes in total assets through borrowing. There is no reason interest
rates cannot be important in one set of decisions and unimportant in
another.
Indeed, some studies point to a fairly close relation between Federal
Reserve loans to member banks and interest rates (or, more appro-
priately, the differential rate on Treasury bills over the discount rate).
The relation allegedly accounts for part of the variation in the free
reserve ratio—that is, the ratio of excess reserves minus borrowings toTHE RESERVE RA TIO 233
deposits.45 Borrowings produce most of the interest sensitivity of the
free reserve ratio;they fluctuate much more over business cycles
than total reserves do.46 These studies are not relevant, therefore, to
the relation between interest rates and the total or usable reserve ratio.
We may conclude that cyclical fluctuations in the reserve ratio
mainly reflect business conditions, not the cost of holding reserves,
insofar as the two differ, as they often do. Apparently banks find their
reserves reduced below a comfortable minimum near reference cycle
peaks, possibly because they have been loath to deny loan applications
by valued customers enjoying prosperity, and take the first opportunity
in a business downturn to replenish reserves. The build-up is moderate
and does not go far, if currency drains in the absence of a panic are
light.The increase exceeds original plans during the ensuing low
points of business activity, presumably because loan demands become
unexpectedly small.
For these and perhaps other reasons, banks contribute to variations
in the rate of growth of the money stock. The reserve ratio displays
considerable irregularity, shown in the patterns for individual cycles
in Chart 21. There is nevertheless a typical pattern.\'Vhen business
recovers, the reserve ratio begins to decline and apparently continues
until the banks' desired minimum level is reached. In the vicinity of
that minimum, the rate of decline in the reserve ratio decreases and so
contributes to a reduced rate of growth of the money stock. Whether
the ratio rises or remains more or less constant until the onset of a
reference contraction, it generally rises thereafter and so contributes
to a decline in the rate of growth of the money stock.Its average
pattern in Chart 2 shows that the reserve ratio played a major part in
forming peaks in specific cycles of the money series but a minor one,
if any, in forming troughs except in panic cycles.
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